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three distinct mechanisms whereby states and institutions  
might influence the behavior of other states: coercion, 
persuasion, and acculturation. Several structural impediments 
preclude effective implementation of coercion- and persuasion-
based regimes in human rights law—yet these models of social 
influence inexplicably predominate in international legal 
studies. In this Article, we first describe in some  
detail the salient conceptual features of each mechanism of 
social influence. We then link each of the identified 
mechanisms to specific regime design characteristics—
identifying several ways in which acculturation might  
occasion a rethinking of fundamental regime design problems 
in human rights law. Through a systematic evaluation of three 
design problems—conditional membership, precision of 
obligations, and enforcement methods—we elaborate  
an alternative way to conceive of regime design. We  
maintain that (1) acculturation is a conceptually distinct social 
process through which state behavior is influenced; and  
(2) the regime design recommendations issuing from this 
approach defy conventional wisdom in international  
human rights scholarship. This exercise not only recommends 
reexamination of policy debates in human rights law, it  
also provides a conceptual framework within which the  
costs and benefits of various design principles might be 
assessed. Our aim is to improve the understanding of how 
norms operate in international society with a view to improving 
the capacity of legal institutions to promote respect for  
human rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International regime design questions are essentially empirical in 
nature.1 Addressing them requires nothing short of understanding the 
social forces that shape the behavior of states—whether rewards and 
penalties, reasoned arguments, or concerns about status might 
influence recalcitrant states (and individuals). In this Article, we 
identify three specific mechanisms for influencing state practice: 
coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. We also describe the distinct, 
and sometimes competing, logic of each mechanism. Optimal regime 
design, we contend, is impossible without identifying and analytically 
foregrounding the mechanisms of influence and their discrete 
characteristics. We consider in detail how these mechanisms of social 
influence might occasion a rethinking of fundamental regime design 
issues in international human rights law. 
The increasing exchange between international relations 
scholarship and international legal scholarship illuminates some of 
the difficulties involved in regime design and offers useful insights to 
 
 1. Drawing on international relations literature, we use the concept of “regime” to refer 
to the formal and informal aspects of a regulatory environment. See Stephen D. Krasner, 
Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (“Regimes can be defined as 
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”).  
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resolve them.2 Much current international relations research focuses 
on theoretical and empirical issues concerning human rights and state 
practice.3 This work has inspired legal analyses of international 
human rights regimes. This groundbreaking “first generation” of 
empirical international legal studies demonstrates that international 
law “matters.”4 Nevertheless, the existing literature does not 
adequately account for the regime design implications of this 
research. Regime design debates often turn on unexamined or 
undefended empirical assumptions about foundational matters such 
as the conditions under which external pressure can influence state 
behavior, which social or political forces are potentially effective, and 
the relationship between state preferences and material and 
ideational structure at the global level. Moreover, prevailing 
approaches to these problems are predicated on a thin and 
underspecified conception of the mechanisms for influencing state 
practice.5 What is needed is a “second generation” of empirical 
international legal studies aimed at clarifying the mechanics of law’s 
influence. This second generation, in our view, should generate 
concrete, empirically falsifiable propositions about the role of law in 
state preference formation and transformation. 
 
 2. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International 
Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter 
Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International 
Relations, 285 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (2000). 
 3. See Hans Peter Schmitz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights, in 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 517 (offering a survey of the 
existing literature). 
 4. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002); Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International 
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1835 (2002); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a 
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 337–66 (1997); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book 
review). We have previously taken a first generation approach in analyzing aspects of human 
rights law. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 
14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173–78 (2003). 
 5. This is a widely recognized deficiency of constructivist scholarship in international 
relations. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 
50 WORLD POL. 324, 325 (1998) (“[C]onstructivism, while good at the macrofoundations of 
behavior and identity (norms, social context), is very weak on the microlevel. It fails to explore 
systematically how norms connect with agents.”); Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International 
Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 487, 488 (2001) (observing that 
constructivists “have not been very successful in explaining the microprocesses about how 
precisely actors are exposed to, receive, process, and then act upon the normative arguments 
that predominate in particular social environments, such as international institutions”). 
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First-generation scholarship in international human rights law 
provides an indispensable but plainly incomplete framework. 
Prevailing approaches suggest that law changes human  
rights practices by either (1) coercing states (and individuals) to 
comply with regime rules,6 or (2) persuading states (and individuals) 
of the validity and legitimacy of human rights law.7 In our view, the 
former approach fails to grasp the complexity of the social 
environment within which states act, and the latter fails to account  
for many ways in which the diffusion of social and legal norms  
occurs. Indeed, a robust cluster of empirical studies in 
interdisciplinary scholarship documents particular processes that 
 
 6. An important strand of international legal scholarship accordingly adheres to the 
coercion model. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and 
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 970 (2000) (book review); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric 
A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115, S124 (2002) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Moral and Legal 
Rhetoric]; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Customary International 
Law]; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1823, 1865–68 (2002); Hathaway, supra note 4, at 2020.  
 7. The persuasion model is also widely endorsed in legal scholarship. See, e.g., THOMAS 
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 8 (1995) [hereinafter 
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW]; THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF 
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 183–94 (1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, LEGITIMACY]; Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2001); 
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 278; Koh, supra note 4, at 2603. Dean Anne-Marie 
Slaughter’s influential work on transgovernmental networks also relies principally on notions of 
persuasion. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government 
Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 205 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) (describing 
transgovernmental networks in which “[t]he dominant currency is engagement and 
persuasion”); see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 51 (2002) 
(“[W]hen networks promote regulatory change, change occurs more through persuasion than 
command.”). Dean Slaughter and Professor Raustiala’s work derives, in significant part, from 
the school of “managerialism” pioneered by Professors Abram and Antonia Chayes. Professors 
Chayes and Chayes’s project understands persuasion as central. See ABRAM CHAYES & 
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 25 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental instrument for maintaining 
compliance with treaties at an acceptable level is an iterative process of discourse among the 
parties, the treaty organization, and the wider public.”); id. at 26 (“Persuasion and argument are 
the principal engines of this process . . . .”). Dean Koh’s work derives more directly from 
political science scholarship concerning transnational advocacy networks. See, e.g., Koh, supra 
note 4, at 2645–59. As Professor Rodger Payne’s survey of that scholarship explains, 
“persuasion is considered the centrally important mechanism for constructing and 
reconstructing social facts.” Rodger A. Payne, Persuasion, Frames, and Norm Construction, 7 
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 37, 38 (2001). 
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socialize states in the absence of coercion or persuasion. These 
studies conclude that the power of social influence can be  
harnessed even if (1) collective action problems and political 
constraints that inhibit effective coercion are not overcome and  
(2) the complete internalization sought through persuasion is not 
achieved.8 We contend that this scholarship now requires  
a reexamination of the empirical foundations of human rights 
regimes. 
In this Article, we provide a more complete conceptual 
framework by identifying a third mechanism by which international 
law might change state behavior—acculturation. By acculturation, we 
mean the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and 
behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture. This mechanism 
induces behavioral changes through pressures to assimilate—some 
imposed by other actors and some imposed by the self. Acculturation 
encompasses a number of microprocesses including mimicry, 
identification, and status maximization. The touchstone of this 
mechanism is that identification with a reference group generates 
varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures—real or imagined—
to conform.9 We do not suggest that international legal scholarship 
 
 8. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1753–54 (2003) (outlining a general theoretical model founded on 
acculturation mechanisms). We should note that some international legal scholars—most 
notably Koh—advance theories relying in part on mechanisms that resemble what we call 
acculturation. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 4, at 2646 (suggesting that “habitual obedience” is part 
of the process of norm incorporation). Koh, however, has not identified what role, if any, global-
level acculturation processes might play in his theoretical model. In Koh’s model, processes that 
most closely resemble acculturation occur at the final stage of norm implementation; they are 
governed primarily by bureaucratic and administrative impulses to follow already accepted legal 
rules. See, e.g., id. at 2655 (explaining that “institutional habits lead nations into default patterns 
of compliance”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International 
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 651–53 (1998) (describing “bureaucratic compliance 
procedures” as the cause for habitual compliance). As mentioned above, Koh’s discussion of 
global-level norm diffusion borrows from political science scholarship on transnational advocacy 
networks, which emphasizes the mechanism of persuasion. See supra note 7. That said, we 
consider our project an extension of Koh’s and others’ work on transnational norm diffusion. 
We intend to supplement that larger constructivist agenda by isolating the microprocesses of 
social influence. 
 9. This insight is most fully developed in the “new institutionalism” in the social sciences. 
Foundational works include THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); W. RICHARD SCOTT & JOHN W. MEYER, 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY AND 
INDIVIDUALISM (1994); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: 
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977); Lynne G. Zucker, 
Institutional Theories of Organization, 13 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 443–64 (1987) [hereinafter 
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has completely failed to identify aspects of this process. Rather, we 
maintain that the mechanism is underemphasized and poorly 
understood, and that it is often conflated (or even confused) with 
other constructivist mechanisms such as persuasion. Differentiating 
the mechanism of acculturation and specifying the microprocesses 
through which it operates are profoundly important, however, for 
addressing questions pertaining to the adoption of international legal 
norms. Indeed, each of the three mechanisms—coercion, persuasion, 
and acculturation—is likely to have distinct implications along a 
number of dimensions, including the durability of norms, the rates 
and patterns of adoption, and the depth of compliance. 
Additionally, we demonstrate how a close analysis of the 
characteristics and function of each mechanism matters for regime 
design. We link each of the three mechanisms of social influence to 
specific regime characteristics—identifying several ways in which 
identifying acculturation as distinct from the better-understood 
mechanisms of coercion and persuasion may occasion a rethinking of 
fundamental design problems in human rights law. In short, we 
reverse-engineer structural regime design principles from the salient 
characteristics of underlying social processes. We maintain that (1) 
acculturation is a conceptually distinct social mechanism that 
influences state behavior and (2) the regime design recommendations 
issuing from acknowledging the role of acculturation defy 
conventional wisdom in international human rights scholarship. We 
contend that, without this understanding, several characteristics of 
international society will frustrate regime design models that seek 
compliance with human rights law solely by coercing and persuading 
noncomplying states. 
Careful readers may argue that the best approach to regime 
design should incorporate elements of all three mechanisms. This 
argument reflects the view that the identified mechanisms reinforce 
each other through a dynamic relationship among them that is 
sacrificed when a regime emphasizes one mechanism to the exclusion 
of others. This is an important point, and it is almost certainly correct. 
However, the kind of analysis contemplated by this line of criticism 
(i.e., the development of an integrated theory of regime design 
accounting for each mechanism) first requires, in our view, 
identification and clear differentiation of these mechanisms. This 
 
Zucker, Institutional Theories]; Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural 
Persistence, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 726, 726 (1977) [hereinafter Zucker, Role of Institutionalization]. 
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conceptual clarification is a first step, which enables subsequent work 
aimed at identifying the conditions under which each of the 
mechanisms would predominate, potentially reinforcing or frustrating 
the operation of the others. Moreover, we think it useful to link 
specific mechanisms to concrete regime design problems. Doing so 
illustrates the design features suggested by each and further clarifies 
the conceptual commitments of each mechanism. Our analysis of 
regime design problems yields three models of human rights regimes 
built on each of the mechanisms. But we do not suggest that any 
regime does or should exhibit all of the features of a single 
mechanism.10 
Before we proceed with our analysis, it is important to note the 
special characteristics of human rights regimes that bracket our 
discussion and that make the investigation of socialization processes 
especially productive in this arena. Most international regimes seek to 
facilitate cooperation or coordination among states.11 The global 
promotion of human rights, however, is importantly different from 
both types of regimes.12 For several reasons, the prevalence of human 
rights violations is not reducible to a simple collective action problem. 
First, states have substantial capacity to promote and protect human 
rights within their territory without coordinating their efforts with 
 
 10. In this sense, we offer our application of the mechanisms to regime design issues in the 
spirit of Max Weber’s “ideal types.” See generally Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science 
and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils & 
Heary A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949). Ideal types are theoretical constructs that model certain 
aspects of the social world. These constructs are useful because they serve as the basis for a 
particular brand of comparative analysis. By comparing an ideal type with a particular historical 
(observable) case, one can determine the extent to which the elements emphasized in the ideal 
type occur in reality. In other words, the ideal type is a useful tool that permits an assessment of 
the extent to which certain attributes or processes exist in a particular case. Id. 
 11. Most international regimes confront pressing collective action problems. See generally 
Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International 
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985) (describing the basic structure of 
various collective action problems).  
 12. These distinctive features are well understood. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The 
Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 
217, 217 (2000) (“[I]nternational human rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate 
policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders, but to hold governments 
accountable for purely internal activities. In contrast to most international regimes, moreover, 
human rights regimes are not generally enforced by interstate action.”); see also JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119–127 (2005) 
(arguing that modern multilateral human rights treaties exert little influence on how states 
choose to behave because these treaties are not self-enforcing and lack effective external 
enforcement).  
GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:48 AM 
2004] SOCIALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 629 
other states. Without question, states retain some substantial measure 
of effective autonomy in this area. Second, many states have little 
clear interest in promoting and protecting human rights abroad. 
Although “bad actors” impose externalities on other states in 
extreme cases (for example, when poor human rights conditions 
trigger massive refugee flows), these externalities arise only 
sporadically and typically affect only a few (bordering) states. Third, 
many states have no interest in promoting and protecting human 
rights domestically. Some states are simply willing to violate human 
rights when it is convenient to do so, and they have no interest in 
accepting structural commitments that may alter their current 
decision processes. Indeed, one of the central regime design problems 
in human rights law is how best to influence “bad actors” to make 
fundamental changes. The question whether international law can 
promote human rights norms may be recast, in an important sense, as 
how human rights regimes can best harness the mechanisms of social 
influence. 
The task of designing effective human rights regimes is further 
complicated by several structural characteristics of international 
society that undercut the potential effectiveness of some strategies. 
Consider two. First, international human rights norms are not self-
enforcing.13 This point issues from the fact that human rights regimes 
do not address coordination problems and that states have no clear, 
direct interest in securing human rights protection in other states. 
Second, good faith participants in such regimes are generally 
unwilling or unable to shoulder the enforcement costs necessary to 
coerce recalcitrant states to comply with human rights norms. This 
“enforcement deficit”—exacerbated by high enforcement costs and 
negligible direct returns—is a political reality of the current 
international order. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we introduce the 
three mechanisms by which actors and institutions influence other 
actors (and their practices). We emphasize the conceptual core of 
each mechanism, analyzing in some detail the ways in which each is 
distinct from the others. This exposition also identifies the schools of 
thought and research programs that suggest the presence and 
characteristics of each. We then apply these three mechanisms to 
three foundational regime design problems in human rights law. In 
 
 13. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 12, at 109–10. 
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Part II, we address the problem of membership—how best to define 
the regime community and articulate regime boundaries. We then 
consider, in Part III, the ways in which each mechanism would 
approach the problem of defining the substantive obligations around 
which a legal community is built. As an important instance of this 
broad problem, we analyze the value of rule precision in defining 
prescribed and proscribed conduct. In Part IV, we discuss how each 
mechanism would approach the problem of compliance and 
effectiveness—specifically how regimes might directly discourage 
undesirable behavior and encourage desirable behavior. In short, we 
assess the implications of each mechanism for common regime design 
problems in human rights law by analyzing the ways in which design 
recommendations issue from the underlying theory of social 
influence. As a means of moving this discussion forward for future 
research, we conclude briefly, in Part V, with some recommendations 
for developing an integrated regime design model. 
I. THREE MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
According to conventional wisdom, there are two ways in which 
international law and international regimes change state behavior (if 
at all): coercion and persuasion.14 These explanations of state 
behavior are conceptually coherent, empirically supported, and 
important. However, substantial evidence suggests that the two 
approaches do not exhaust the ways in which actors and institutions 
exert influence on the behavior of others.15 As introduced above, we 
suggest a third mechanism, acculturation, whereby conformity is 
elicited through a range of socialization processes. To develop the 
typology further, we first discuss in more detail the character of the 
typology itself. We then describe the attributes of each mechanism. In 
this Part, we seek only to model generally the three mechanisms. In 
the remainder of the Article, we apply these models to several 
concrete problems of regime design in human rights law. 
Before we proceed, it is useful to make a couple of points about 
the state of the field in international relations and international law as 
it pertains to these mechanisms. Extending at least two decades back, 
 
 14. See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 12, at 220 (“Existing scholarship seeking to explain why 
national governments establish and enforce formal international human rights norms focuses on 
two modes of interstate interaction: coercion and normative persuasion.”). 
 15. See infra Part I.C. 
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scholars have generally divided into two camps: rationalists and 
constructivists. The former emphasizes military-economic power and 
global material structure, whereas the latter emphasizes norms and 
global ideational structure.16 Despite the considerable 
accomplishments of both camps, the microprocesses of social 
influence are often underspecified, underanalyzed, or, at best, 
underexplained. Several important questions merit more sustained 
reflection. For example, how exactly do norms change behavior or 
attitudes? Do social sanctions impose costs that states weigh against 
other interests, or do social sanctions function more as cognitive 
cues? If one mechanism through which norms influence actors is 
“persuasion,” what exactly are the microprocesses by which 
persuasion works? Our project calls for reorienting the academic 
discussion toward such issues of microprocess. We discuss how the 
mechanisms of coercion and persuasion work, in part, by contrasting 
them with the third mechanism of acculturation. 
Initially, note that these mechanisms are essentially theories of 
how preferences form and the conditions under which preferences 
change. These theories vary in their claims about whether, and to 
what degree, international institutions prompt endogenous change in 
the preferences and identities of actors. This immediately suggests 
that our project is linked to ontological debates between rationalists 
and constructivists in international relations theory.17 The typology 
that we develop here does not track these debates. Indeed, many 
constructivist scholars rely on coercion as a lever of change. These 
scholars suggest that norms and ideas matter in international politics 
in part because they provide a reservoir of symbolic authority that 
may, in various ways, be brought to bear on recalcitrant states. For 
example, socialization processes may exert direct influence over third 
parties (e.g., donor countries), who in turn use traditional coercive 
techniques to effect compliance in the target state. In this vein, 
Professors Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argue that 
transnational activist networks utilize international norms to 
persuade domestic audiences to coerce target governments.18 
Likewise, many rationalist scholars suggest that the social context of 
 
 16. ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 33–38 (1999). 
 17. See James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical 
View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 52.  
 18. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 16–25 (1998). 
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international institutions (including the attendant structural 
opportunities for persuasion and learning) influences the 
effectiveness of traditional coercive techniques. For example, 
Professor Lisa Martin argues that threats made within a highly 
institutionalized environment are more credible because of the 
greater ‘‘audience costs’’ in this social setting.19 And Professor 
Leonard Schoppa suggests that coercive tactics are more effective 
when they accord with widely shared procedural norms governing 
international bargaining.20 It is fair to say that rationalists emphasize 
the coercion mechanism21 and that constructivists emphasize the 
persuasion mechanism,22 but the rationalist-constructivist debate 
concerns matters that are, for the most part, beyond the scope of this 
Article. Our typology outlines the microprocesses by which social 
context influences actors—without building into these models 
additional assumptions about the character of actors. Conventional 
approaches de-emphasize, and often ignore, other ways in which 
institutions and actors exert influence.23 
One aspect of the prevailing theoretical landscape is that 
acculturation sometimes appears obliquely in constructivist accounts 
of human rights law. That is, constructivist scholars, in describing the 
mechanics of “persuasion,” occasionally slip into accounts that rely on 
various aspects of acculturation.24 Surveys of constructivist 
 
 19. Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions, 
45 WORLD POL. 406, 413 (1993).  
 20. Leonard J. Schoppa, The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining, 53 INT’L 
ORG. 307, 310 (1999). 
 21. See, e.g., Daniel W. Drezner, Introduction: The Interaction of Domestic and 
International Institutions, in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 12–13 (Daniel Drezner ed., 2003) 
(associating coercion techniques with “the neorealist paradigm”); Johnston, supra note 5, at 
489–90 (noting that neorealist theories often overlook techniques other than coercion).  
 22. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 495 (arguing that a focus on internalization causes 
constructivists to “focus on persuasion”); Payne, supra note 7, at 38 (asserting that 
constructivists focus on persuasive messages). 
 23. See, e.g., Drezner, supra note 21, at 11; Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in 
International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379, 380 (1999).  
 24. See, e.g., Christian Reus-Smit, Human Rights and the Social Construction of 
Sovereignty, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 519, 526–28 (2001); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The 
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in 
THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 14 
(Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) (“In the area of human rights, persuasion and socialization 
often involve processes such as shaming and denunciations . . . . Persuasion is also not devoid of 
conflict. It often involves not just reasoning with opponents, but also pressures, arm-twisting, 
and sanctions.”).  
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scholarship, however, often expressly identify persuasion as the 
central mechanism of social influence.25 This failure to differentiate 
between importantly distinct social processes leaves undone several 
important tasks, including defining the elements that differentiate 
persuasion from social sanctions, examining whether social sanctions 
exhaust the forms of acculturation, and determining when techniques 
of persuasion and acculturation conflict. In the following discussion, 
we draw from empirical studies that focus squarely on processes of 
acculturation to define the distinctiveness and significance of each 
mechanism. 
In this Part, we develop in some detail the meaning of each of the 
three mechanisms and briefly describe the research suggesting their 
presence and general features. We do not attempt to prove or 
disprove the empirical validity of the identified causal mechanisms. In 
our view, substantial evidence suggests that each of these modes of 
social influence occurs in global politics and that there are conditions 
under which each is expected to predominate. An open question is 
how the international community might employ this burgeoning 
empirical record to build more effective, more responsive human 
rights institutions. We consider each mechanism in turn. 
A. Coercion 
The first, and most obvious, social mechanism is coercion—
whereby states and institutions influence the behavior of other states 
by escalating the benefits of conformity or the costs of nonconformity 
through material rewards and punishments.26 Of course, coercion does 
not necessarily involve any change in the target actor’s underlying 
preferences. For example, even if state A would prefer to continue 
practice X, it may discontinue the practice to avoid the sanctions 
threatened by states B, C, and D. Note that the coercive gesture of 
states B, C, and D would prove ineffective if state A perceived that 
the expected benefit of practice X exceeded the expected cost of the 
threatened sanctions. Take a more concrete example. The United 
States, under the Foreign Assistance Act, denies foreign assistance to 
states “engag[ing] in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
 
 25. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 495 (“The focus on internalization tends to lead 
constructivists to focus on persuasion.”); Payne, supra note 7, at 38 (pointing out that 
“persuasion is considered the centrally important mechanism” for constructivists). 
 26. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 489–94 (noting that classic international relations 
theories focus on “realpolitik pursuits of interest”); see also sources cited supra note 6. 
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internationally recognized human rights.”27 Any state denied 
assistance on this basis is thereby coerced to alter its behavior. Under 
the logic of coercion, states and institutions change the behavior of 
other states not by reorienting their preferences but by changing the 
cost-benefit calculations of the target state. Also, although 
international institutions do not reconfigure state interests and 
preferences, they may, under certain conditions, constrain strategic 
choices by stabilizing mutual expectations about state behavior.28 Put 
simply, states change their behavior because they perceive it to be in 
their material interest to do so. 
Theories suggesting the predominance of coercion build on more 
general theories about the character of international politics. 
Proponents of this school of thought often contend that the material 
distribution of power among states essentially determines state 
behavior.29 Normative and institutional developments thus reflect the 
interests of powerful states,30 and compliance with these norms is 
largely a function of powerful states’ willingness to enforce them.31 
Consistent with this view, international institutions facilitate state 
cooperation and coordination by reducing transaction costs and 
overcoming other collective action problems. This perspective is 
typically, though not exclusively, associated with “rationalist” or 
rational choice approaches to international relations. As noted above, 
however, coercion plays an important role in constructivist models of 
state behavior as well.32 
 
 27. 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a) (2000). 
 28. Even if international institutions do not further the coercive enterprise directly, they 
might define more clearly what counts as a cooperative move. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, 
AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 51–
55 (1984) (summarizing the process of international cooperation and “policy coordination”); 
Jeffrey W. Legro, Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism, 51 INT’L 
ORG. 31, 35–38 (1997).  
 29. See generally NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986) 
(elaborating the foundations of this school of thought). 
 30. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (2001); Goldsmith & 
Posner, Customary International Law, supra note 6, at 1174–75. 
 31. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in REGIME THEORY 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139, 165–67 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993); A.M. Weisburd, 
Implications of International Relations Theory for the International Law of Human Rights, 38 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 101–11 (1999). 
 32. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.  
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B. Persuasion 
The second mechanism of social influence is persuasion—the 
active, often strategic, inculcation of norms.33 Persuasion theory 
suggests that international law influences state behavior through 
processes of social “learning” and other forms of information 
conveyance.34 Persuasion “is not simply a process of manipulating 
exogenous incentives to elicit desired behavior from the other side,” 
but rather “requires argument and deliberation in an effort to change 
the minds of others.”35 Persuaded actors “internalize” new norms and 
rules of appropriate behavior and redefine their interests and 
identities accordingly.36 The touchstone of this approach is that actors 
are consciously convinced of the truth, validity, or appropriateness of 
a norm, belief, or practice.37 That is, persuasion occurs when actors 
actively assess the content of a particular message—a norm, practice, 
or belief—and “change their minds.”38 
Next, consider how persuasion works—a matter explored in 
depth in a vast, interdisciplinary literature.39 At the risk of 
 
 33. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 16; Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, 
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 894–909 (1998); Thomas 
Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 1 (2000). For 
important legal arguments relying on a persuasion mechanism, see FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 40–46, and Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 278.  
 34. See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
141 (1996) (arguing that even “[n]ormative claims become powerful and prevail by being 
persuasive”). 
 35. Alastair Iain Johnston, The Social Effects of International Institutions on Domestic (and 
Foreign Policy) Actors, in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 21, at 145, 153.  
 36. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary 
Europe, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 83, 98–99 (1999) (illustrating that the diffusion of ideas led Germany 
to develop new norms and behaviors with respect to citizenship and national minorities); Koh, 
supra note 4, at 2646 (“[A] transaction generates a legal rule which will guide future 
transnational interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those 
norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the 
interests and even the identities of the participants in the process.”). 
 37. This is a long-held view in social psychology. See, e.g., CARL IVER HOVLAND ET AL., 
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE 10–12, 
36–38 (1953) (outlining the steps in the persuasion process, including attention, comprehension, 
and acceptance of message). 
 38. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 496 (“[Persuasion] involves changing minds, 
opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or 
mental coercion.”). 
 39. See THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) [hereinafter PERSUASION HANDBOOK] 
(surveying literature across disciplines); PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, THE 
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oversimplifying this rich and varied body of work, we highlight two 
factors that determine, in substantial part, the persuasiveness of 
counterattitudinal messages. The first and most important technique 
of persuasion is “framing.” The basic idea is that the persuasive 
appeal of a counterattitudinal message increases if the issue is 
strategically framed to resonate with already accepted norms.40 Many 
studies of this technique emphasize the role of strategic “norm 
entrepreneurs,” who manipulate frames to resonate with target 
audiences.41 One widely studied and highly successful example of such 
strategic framing is the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines. 
The campaign—which culminated in the Ottawa Convention banning 
the production and use of the weapons—successfully framed the issue 
in terms of the “indiscriminate nature and effects” of landmines, 
thereby linking the issue with a universally accepted principle of 
humanitarian law (and other successful campaigns against weapons of 
mass destruction).42 
 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 127–67 (1991) (surveying social 
psychology literature); Diana Mutz et al., Political Persuasion: The Birth of a Field of Study, in 
POLITICAL PERSUASION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 1, 1–17 (Diana Mutz et al. eds., 1996) 
(surveying political science research). 
 40. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 17–18; David A. Snow & Robert D. 
Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization, in FROM STRUCTURE TO 
ACTION: COMPARING SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH ACROSS CULTURES 197 (Bert 
Klandermans et al. eds., 1988); David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, 
Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 467–75 (1986) 
(discussing types of frame alignment processes and transformations).  
 41. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929 
(1996) (defining “norm entrepreneurs” as individuals who “can alert people to the existence of a 
shared complaint and can suggest a collective solution. . . . (a) signaling their own commitment 
to change, (b) creating coalitions, (c) making defiance of the norms seem or be less costly, and 
(d) making compliance with new norms seem or be more beneficial”). International lawyers 
have developed the concept in the context of transnational politics. See, e.g., Ethan A. 
Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society, 44 
INT’L ORG. 479, 482 (1990) (defining transnational norm entrepreneurs as international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or individuals who (1) “mobilize popular opinion and 
political support both within their host country and abroad”; (2) “stimulate and assist in the 
creation of like-minded organizations in other countries”; (3) “play a significant role in elevating 
their objective beyond its identification with the national interests of their government”; and (4) 
often direct their efforts “toward persuading foreign audiences, especially foreign elites, that a 
peculiar . . . regime reflects a widely shared or even universal moral sense, rather than the 
peculiar moral code of one society”); see also Koh, supra note 4, at 2612 (arguing that William 
Wilberforce, Henry Dunant, William Ladd, and Elihu Burritt pioneered norm-generating 
developments). 
 42. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land 
Mines, 52 INT’L ORG. 613, 622–30 (1998). 
GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:48 AM 
2004] SOCIALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 637 
A second technique of persuasion is “cuing” target audiences to 
“think harder” about the merits of a counterattitudinal message. 
Cuing is based on the idea that the introduction of new information 
often prompts actors to “engage in a high intensity process of 
cognition, reflection, and argument.”43 Substantial empirical evidence 
suggests that actors often change their beliefs when, faced with new 
information, they systematically examine and defend their positions.44 
Given its general features, this microprocess works best in iterated, 
highly institutionalized social environments wherein new information 
is routinely and systematically linked to broadly shared attitudes.45 As 
a practical matter, documentation and study of the extent of human 
rights abuses (and the conditions under which abuses are likely) 
might cue states to reexamine current practices and positions—
particularly within the framework of international human rights 
institutions. For example, the extensive documentation of gross 
human rights abuses in several Latin American military governments 
in the 1970s and 1980s prompted states to reconsider the scope and 
character of international human rights regimes.46 Important changes 
followed in many intergovernmental organizations at the regional and 
international levels.47 This example, however, should not encourage a 
narrow view of the kind of information likely to produce these cuing 
effects. Indeed, new information about the preferences of other states 
might prompt states to reexamine their own views or practices.48 The 
new information need not concern matters endogenous to the 
international institution. 
 
 43. Johnston, supra note 5, at 496. 
 44. See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 39, at 192–97 (summarizing important 
developments in the field).  
 45. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading 
Russians to Tolerate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 819, 833–37 (1998). 
 46. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 89–97 (summarizing these developments). 
 47. Id.  
 48. See, e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 33, at 895–905 (arguing that norm 
internalization occurs when the number of states accepting a norm reaches a “tipping point” 
triggering “norm cascades”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1187 (1997) (noting that group identity and norm enforcement “are especially 
important to law and, in particular, to the relationship between law and ‘norm cascades,’” which 
produce “large-scale behavioral shifts”); Sunstein, supra note 41, at 909 (“Norm bandwagons 
occur when small shifts lead to large ones, as people join the ‘bandwagon’; norm cascades occur 
when there are rapid shifts in norms.”).  
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Cuing often operates more like “teaching”—depending on the 
character of the issue and the predisposition of the relevant actors.49 
In some circumstances, actors and institutions might convince target 
audiences to discard previously held views by conveying authoritative 
information discrediting those views.50 This specie of cuing is 
particularly important in addressing inadvertent or uninformed 
nonobservance of community standards.51 
C. Acculturation 
A burgeoning, interdisciplinary literature suggests another 
important mechanism of social influence—acculturation. By 
acculturation, we mean the general process of adopting the beliefs 
and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.52 This mechanism 
induces behavioral changes through pressures to assimilate—some 
imposed by other actors and some imposed by the self.53 
Acculturation encompasses a number of microprocesses, including 
orthodoxy, mimicry, identification, and status maximization.54 Our 
claim is that individual behavior (and community-level behavioral 
regularities) is in part a function of social structure—the relations 
between individual actors and some reference group(s). 
Acculturation induces behavioral changes not only by changing the 
target actor’s incentive structure or mind but also by changing the 
actor’s social environment. In this Section, we first specify some of 
 
 49. See, e.g., FINNEMORE, supra note 34, at 135–39 (discussing the importance of the 
“interaction between international structures and local agents of change”). 
 50. See id. at 34–68 (discussing the example of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)). 
 51. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 17–28; see also Jonas Tallberg, Paths to 
Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56 INT’L ORG. 609, 613–14 
(2002). 
 52. See generally RUPERT BROWN, GROUP PROCESSES: DYNAMICS WITHIN AND 
BETWEEN GROUPS 53–64, 123–66 (2d ed. 2000) (describing the dynamics of this process and 
summarizing empirical research). 
 53.  See, e.g., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 9, 
at 1–38; SCOTT & MEYER, supra note 9, at 100–10 (discussing the institutional conditions that 
lead to diffusion of ideas and social persuasion); Meyer & Rowan, supra note 9, at 348–58; 
Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9, at 450–60; Zucker, Role of Institutionalization, 
supra note 9, at 730–41.  
 54. See, e.g., Elvin Hatch, Theories of Social Honor, 91 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 341 (1989) 
(summarizing cross-cultural research); Johnston, supra note 5, at 499–502 (summarizing 
research on this point across several disciplines); see also ROMANO HARRE, SOCIAL BEING: A 
THEORY FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1979) (providing a more extended statement of this 
research agenda in psychology and sociology). 
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the ways in which acculturation occurs. We then clarify the 
relationship between this mechanism and the other two previously 
discussed. Finally, we analyze (at a conceptually abstract level) how 
institutions might harness acculturation to socialize recalcitrant states. 
1. The Microprocesses of Acculturation. The touchstone of 
acculturation is that varying degrees of identification with a reference 
group generate varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures—real 
or imagined—to conform.55 The operation of this mechanism is best 
understood by reference to well-documented individual-level 
phenomena. One of the central insights of social psychology is that 
individual behavior and cognition reflect substantial social influence.56 
Actors, in an important sense, are influenced by their environment; 
indeed, this generalized influence is one important way that “culture” 
is transmitted and reproduced. Although culture is typically 
understood as “learned behavior,” much of what actors absorb from 
their social environment is not simply “informational social 
influence.”57 Children, for example, do not simply learn a menu of 
culturally significant facts. Rather, the acculturation of children 
involves both the transmission of information and the inculcation of 
social values and norms. Social influence is a rich process—one that 
also includes “normative social influence” whereby actors are 
impelled to adopt appropriate attitudes and behaviors. We explain 
here the cognitive and social aspects of normative social influence.58 
We also identify evidence suggesting their presence and form. We do 
not intend to dwell on points that will strike many readers as 
obviously true. Our objective here is only to identify, with some 
conceptual precision, the salient general characteristics of the 
acculturation process. 
 
 55. See ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 250–97 (4th ed. 2002) (identifying 
when people tend to conform to normative social influences).  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 255–63. 
 58. As a conceptual matter, the cognitive and social processes identified are somewhat 
imprecise. Without question, some of the processes that we label “cognitive” are importantly 
“social” and vice versa. In addition, the cognitive and social microprocesses are mutually 
reinforcing. Although a more formal (and more extended) treatment would clarify the 
conceptual boundaries (and feedback loops) between these two levels of acculturation, such an 
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, we need only identify some of the 
ways in which acculturation works—and we need only specify these microprocesses with 
sufficient precision to facilitate a sensible comparison with coercion and persuasion. 
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First, acculturation is propelled by cognitive pressures. Actors in 
several respects are driven to conform. These internal pressures 
include (1) social-psychological costs of nonconformity (such as 
dissonance associated with conduct that is inconsistent with an actor’s 
identity or social roles),59 and (2) social-psychological benefits of 
conforming to group norms and expectations (such as the “cognitive 
comfort” associated with both high social status60 and membership in 
a perceived “in-group”61). “Cognitive dissonance”—defined broadly 
as the discomfort caused by holding two or more inconsistent 
cognitions—is a useful example.62 This phenomenon is part of a family 
of cognitive processes related to the basic human need to justify one’s 
actions to oneself and others.63 Substantial empirical evidence 
demonstrates that individuals experience discomfort—including 
anxiety, regret, and guilt—whenever they confront cognitions about 
some aspect of their behavior inconsistent with their self-concept 
(including any social roles central to their identity).64 Individuals are 
highly motivated to minimize this dissonance by either changing their 
behavior or finding ways to justify their past behavior.65 Therefore, 
there are internal pressures driving actors to act and think in ways 
consistent with the social roles and expectations internalized by such 
 
 59. See, e.g., JOHN C. TURNER, REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-
CATEGORIZATION THEORY 68–69 (1987); Robert Axelrod, Promoting Norms: An Evolutionary 
Approach to Norms, in THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 44, 55–57 (Robert Axelrod ed., 
1997); Christopher Barnum, A Reformulated Social Identity Theory, 14 ADVANCES IN GROUP 
PROCESSES 29 (1997).  
 60. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND 
THE QUEST FOR STATUS 31–33 (1985) (arguing that high status is a good itself—generating a 
range of psychological benefits); see also ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE 
STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 71–95 (1988) (discussing how the “sincere-manner” and 
“reputation” pathways lead individuals to develop moral sentiments). 
 61. See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN 
PERSUASION 163–99 (1984) (suggesting that individuals are most likely to adhere to certain 
behavior if other individuals with whom they identify are displaying that behavior).  
 62. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); see 
also generally Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and the Self-Concept, in COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 3–19 (Eddie 
Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999). 
 63. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 173–212.  
 64. See id. at 174–76.  
 65. See, e.g., SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION 
AND THE HEALTHY MIND 123–33 (1989) (summarizing various methods of dealing with 
dissonance, such as illusion, repression, and denial); Frederick X. Gibbons et al., Cognitive 
Reactions to Smoking Relapse: The Reciprocal Relations Between Dissonance and Self Esteem, 
72 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 184, 192 (1997) (suggesting that people with high self-esteem are 
more defensive when faced with dissonance). 
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actors. An implication of this pressure is that, once actors internalize 
some role (or any other identity formation), they are impelled to act 
and think in ways consistent with the highly legitimated purposes and 
attributes of that role.66 As a consequence, orthodoxy and social 
legitimacy are internalized as authoritative guides for human action.67 
Second, acculturation is also propelled by social pressures—real 
or imagined pressures applied by a group. These pressures—which 
are no doubt more familiar to many readers—include (1) the 
imposition of social-psychological costs through shaming or shunning 
and (2) the conferral of social-psychological benefits through “back-
patting” and other displays of public approval.68 In short, actors hoard 
social legitimacy and social status, and they minimize social 
disapproval. Consider, for example, social-psychological studies of 
conformity. Substantial empirical evidence demonstrates that, in the 
face of real or perceived social pressure from a reference group, 
actors often change their behavior to conform to the behavioral 
patterns of the group.69 Moreover, actors systematically conform 
(under the right conditions) even if the group is clearly wrong and 
even if there are strong incentives to be accurate.70 Because this 
variant of acculturation results from external pressure, it often leads 
 
 66. See, e.g., E. Tory Higgins, Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect, in THE 
SELF IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 152–71 (Roy F. Baumeister ed., 1999); E. Tory Higgins, The “Self 
Digest”: Self-Knowledge Serving Self Regulatory Functions, 71 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1062, 
1067–72 (1996); E. Tory Higgins & John A. Bargh, Social Cognition and Social Perception, 38 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 369, 382–87 (1987). 
 67. One consequence is that actors seek reliable models of appropriate behavior. 
Therefore, actors “mimic” the behavior of other highly legitimated actors. This effect is well 
documented in the sociology of organizations literature. See, e.g., W. RICHARD SCOTT, 
INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 124–28 (1995) (discussing, in the context of collective 
responses to institutional environments, how states mimic behavior).  
 68. See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note 61, at 23–27 (describing the many components of what 
the author terms “weapons of automatic influence”); Richard E. Petty et al., Attitudes and 
Attitude Change, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 609, 612–20 (1997). These microprocesses are well 
represented in the international law literature—though they are typically embedded in a 
coercion model of social influence. See, e.g., Risse & Sikkink, supra note 24, at 11–35 (outlining 
a “spiral model” of socialization incorporating elements of coercion, persuasion, and shaming). 
 69. See, e.g., ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 250–97 (discussing the roles of conformity 
and social pressure). 
 70. See, e.g., Robert S. Baron et al., The Forgotten Variable in Conformity Research: Impact 
of Task Importance on Social Influence, 71 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 915, 924 (1996) (providing 
two case studies that found that “heightening incentives for accuracy actually heightened 
participants’ susceptibility to an inaccurate group consensus”). 
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to public compliance with, but not private acceptance of, social 
norms.71 
Importantly, actors obviously do not always bow to social 
pressure. The influential “social impact theory” provides one useful 
way to condense the empirical record into a small cluster of factors 
that determine the likelihood of success for social pressure. Social 
impact theory suggests that the likelihood of conformity turns on the 
strength, immediacy, and size of the group.72 Each of these variables is 
positively correlated with effective social influence: (1) conformity 
with group norms becomes more likely as the importance of the 
group to the target actor increases (and as the importance of the issue 
to the group increases); (2) conformity increases as the target actor’s 
exposure to the group increases; and (3) conformity increases—up to 
a point—as the size of the reference group increases.73 
To summarize briefly, actors are amenable to social influence via 
acculturation processes. These processes—including orthodoxy, 
mimicry, and status maximization—mobilize internal and external 
pressures impelling actors, under the right conditions, to adopt 
socially legitimated attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Next we address 
a few important questions that derive from this foundation: whether 
this mechanism is importantly different than coercion and persuasion, 
and whether (and in what manner) states are amenable to this type of 
social influence. 
2. Acculturation as Incomplete Internalization: Distinguishing 
Persuasion. Despite the obvious similarities, acculturation differs 
from persuasion in important respects. First, persuasion requires 
acceptance of the validity or legitimacy of a belief, practice, or 
norm—acculturation requires only that an actor perceive that an 
important reference group harbors the belief, engages in the practice, 
 
 71. See, e.g., ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 264 (collecting citations to other research). 
 72. See, e.g., Bibb Latané et al., Measuring Emergent Social Phenomena: Dynamism, 
Polarization, and Clustering as Order Parameters of Social Systems, 39 BEHAV. SCI. 1, 1–22 
(1994); Bibb Latané, The Psychology of Social Impact, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 343, 343–54 
(1981). 
 73. This last point requires some clarification. The empirical record suggests that group size 
is positively correlated with social influence/conformity up to a certain point (typically from 
three to eight or so), but then the effect diminishes rapidly. In other words, going from two to 
three group members matters far more than going from twenty-two to twenty-three or ninety-
two to ninety-three. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 275–77 (discussing the importance 
of group dynamics).  
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or subscribes to the norm. Second, persuasion requires active 
assessment of the merits of a belief.74 Acculturation processes, in 
contrast, frequently operate tacitly; it is often the very act of 
conforming that garners social approval and alleviates cognitive 
discomfort.75 Persuasion involves assessment of the content of the 
message (even if only indirectly); acculturation involves assessment of 
the social relation (the degree of identification) between the target 
audience and some group. Acculturation occurs not as a result of the 
content of the relevant rule or norm but rather as a function of social 
structure—the relations between individual actors and some 
reference group. Acculturation depends less on the properties of the 
rule than on the properties of the relationship of the actor to the 
community. Because the acculturation process does not involve 
actually agreeing with the merits of a group’s position, it may result in 
outward conformity with a social convention without private 
acceptance or corresponding changes in private practices. 
 
 74. It is also important to note that we include in our conception of acculturation a 
microprocess identified in the persuasion literature. One well-documented finding is that the 
relationship between the persuader and the target audience may foster (or impede) “persuasion.” 
That is, the “persuasiveness” of a message—controlling for its content—varies according to the 
relationship between the persuader and persuadee. Although this factor is not central in human 
rights literature, it is important to mention this dimension of acculturation because of its 
significance for institutional design in general. Again, the scholarship studying various 
manifestations of this dynamic is vast, but for our purposes we highlight one important point: 
substantial evidence suggests that positive affect relationships foster “persuasion.” See 
PERSUASION HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 289–328 (summarizing recent developments in this 
research). The idea here is simple. If the persuadee trusts, “likes,” respects, or identifies with the 
persuader, the persuasiveness of claims advanced by the persuader increases. See, e.g., James H. 
Kuklinski & Norman L. Hurley, It’s a Matter of Interpretation, in POLITICAL PERSUASION AND 
ATTITUDE CHANGE, supra note 39, at 129–31; Petty et al., supra note 68, at 612–29 (reviewing 
empirical developments on attitudes and persuasion). In the international relations literature 
specifically, see Risse, supra note 33, at 20–21, arguing that “trust in the authenticity of the 
speaker is a precondition for the persuasiveness of a moral argument.” Moreover, a related 
finding of these studies is that such affect relations are fostered in iterated, highly 
institutionalized environments. Id. Examples of this microprocess abound. Consider Professor 
Steven Ratner’s study of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe; Professor Ratner demonstrates that such “normative 
intermediaries,” if perceived as impartial and legitimate, persuade states (and other parties to 
ethnic conflicts) to de-escalate tensions and embrace rule-of-law values in their dealings with 
each other. Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?, 32 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 591, 678–83 (2000). In this example, the perceived impartiality and 
legitimacy of the persuader imbued him with normative authority and instilled trust in the target 
audience. Id. at 681–82. Because, in this scenario, the persuadee does not actively assess the 
content of the message, we classify this affect-driven “persuasion” as “acculturation.”  
 75. See tbl. 1.  
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These insights are obviously constructivist in that they emphasize 
the role of social interaction in preference and identity formation. As 
such, the acculturation mechanism shares many conceptual 
commitments with the persuasion mechanism. Indeed, it is fair to say 
that acculturation is, in many respects, part of the broader process of 
persuasion. That is, acculturation may serve as the cultural predicate 
for all acts of persuasion. Regardless of whether this claim is accurate, 
the analytical distinction between the two mechanisms is coherent 
and meaningful. Moreover, because complete “internalization” is 
often elusive in international affairs—particularly on many 
contentious human rights issues—international legal studies should 
fashion a framework for analyzing socialization that falls short of this 
standard. We maintain that social forces influence actors in many 
ways other than internalization and that law and legal institutions 
might harness these social forces to promote rule-of-law values. 
Critics might argue that this distinction between acculturation 
and persuasion has no difference. There are two variants of this 
criticism: (1) the conceptual distinction is not amenable to systematic 
empirical testing because it is not falsifiable and (2) the conceptual 
distinction is so fine that no important regime design choices turn on 
it. Both variants miss the mark. First, substantial empirical evidence 
demonstrates the presence and importance of acculturation as a 
distinct mode of social influence.76 The empirical research in 
psychology, sociology, and political science also strongly suggests the 
importance of processes of acculturation in shaping state identity, 
preferences, interests, and behavior.77 Some of these studies 
emphasize the significance of group identification and cognitive 
frames in influencing state action.78 The studies also predict spurious 
forms of compliance and peculiar patterns of norm diffusion 
associated with acculturation.79 Second, this distinction, though fine, 
matters for regime design. As we analyze in great detail below, the 
 
 76. See, e.g., ARONSON ET AL., supra note 55, at 173–212; SCOTT, supra note 67, at 44–45. 
 77. See generally Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1753–65 (summarizing this empirical 
work). 
 78. See, e.g., John Boli, World Polity Sources of Expanding State Authority and 
Organizations, 1870–1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY, 
AND THE INDIVIDUAL 21 (George Thomas et al. eds., 1987); John W. Meyer et al., World 
Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 149–57 (1997).  
 79. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1758–61; John W. Meyer et al., supra note 
78, at 155–58 (describing “decoupling” and “expansive structuration”).  
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unique characteristics of acculturation favor regime design choices 
that are antithetical to the choices suggested by persuasion.80 
3. Acculturation as Social Sanctions and Rewards: 
Distinguishing Coercion. The distinction between acculturation and 
coercion also requires some clarification. Although the distinction is 
clear at a high level of abstraction, the way in which we define 
acculturation potentially blurs the distinction between the two at a 
lower level of abstraction. Recall that, on our view, acculturation 
processes include social sanctions and rewards, such as shaming and 
back-patting.81 Many readers will justifiably think that this definition 
of acculturation eviscerates the distinction between coercion and 
acculturation and that, as a consequence, social sanctions and rewards 
should be part of the coercion category. 
The conceptual distinction between coercion and acculturation, 
however, is straightforward. Coercion encompasses social sanctions 
that influence actors because those actors conclude that social costs 
will translate into material costs. Acculturation, on the other hand, 
includes these coercive elements only to the extent that social costs, in 
and of themselves, influence thought and action. This dimension of 
acculturation captures those circumstances in which actors conform to 
social pressure not because of a second-order calculation of the 
specific costs and benefits but rather because “conforming” and 
“belonging” themselves confer substantial affective returns 
(“cognitive comfort”).82 In addition, actors are engaged in the 
generalized pursuit of social legitimacy—and this orientation is 
deeply internalized.83  
Simple coercion models cannot adequately account for these 
effects because the costs and benefits associated with specific decision 
points are too vague and diffuse to guide action in any meaningful 
sense. Indeed, economists recognize a sharp theoretical distinction 
between “material preferences” and “social preferences.”84 Moreover, 
there are good reasons to analyze pure social costs differently. 
 
 80. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 81. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 82. See, e.g., TIM WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE 
UNCONSCIOUS (2002).  
 83. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5, at 501. 
 84. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 687, 689 (2002) (explaining the distinction). 
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Consider that these costs are virtually incalculable; indeed, much 
social science evidence suggests that actors do not attempt to 
calculate them in any systematic way.85 In addition, substantial 
evidence suggests that actors systematically fail to forecast accurately 
their future affective states (and the impact that certain practices will 
have on those states).86 In contrast, the expected influence and effects 
of material rewards are more amenable to conventional cost-benefit 
modeling.  
4. Acculturation and the State. Although substantial evidence 
demonstrates that acculturation processes occur and, more precisely, 
how they take place, there is good reason to question whether states 
as such are amenable to acculturation. After all, much of the research 
suggesting the presence of this mechanism centers on the cognitive 
processes of individuals. Do states “identify” with a reference group 
in any meaningful sense? Do states respond to cognitive frameworks 
and social pressures? Substantial evidence strongly suggests, on both 
counts, that they do. As we summarize in an earlier article, there is a 
rich empirical (and theoretical) literature—so-called “world polity 
institutionalism”—documenting cultural and associational aspects of 
international politics that suggest the influence of acculturation on 
state action.87 This scholarship has direct roots in the sociology of 
organizations and, more specifically, in empirical studies that 
demonstrate how the goals and composition of formal organizations 
such as corporations, universities, and public hospitals derive in 
considerable part from their wider social environment.88 A 
methodologically simple, yet enormously useful, innovation is to 
 
 85. Recent empirical work on cognitive organization suggests that actors often engage in 
affect-based decisionmaking rather than reason-based decisionmaking. See, e.g., Melissa L. 
Finucane et al., Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect and Reason, in EMERGING 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 327 (Sandra L. Schneider & James 
Shanteau eds., 2003) (describing the “affect heuristic”). Moreover, substantial evidence suggests 
that actors do not calculate utility systematically (or even reliably). See, e.g., JONATHAN 
BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 303–33 (3d ed. 2000) (describing multiple deficiencies in 
valuation); id. at 357–80 (describing common cognitive errors in quantitative assessments). 
 86. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert & Tim Wilson, Affective Forecasting, in 35 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 345, 383 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2003) (arguing that “affective 
forecast[ing]” is hindered by “misconstruing the nature of the future event, errors in recall of 
past emotional experiences, faulty affective theories, failures to correct for unique influences on 
forecasts, and framing”).  
 87. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1757–65.  
 88. SCOTT, supra note 67, at 44–45. 
GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:48 AM 
2004] SOCIALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 647 
study the state as a formal organization—taking the sociology of 
organizations to the global level. 
In organizational sociology, theories of acculturation predict that 
socialization processes will press organizations toward increasing 
“isomorphism”—that is, structural similarity across organizations.89 
These theoretical models also predict that increasing homogenization 
will not reflect the functional task demands of organizations.90 Rather 
than correlating with local task demands, structural attributes and 
goals of an organization will correlate with attributes and goals of 
other organizations at the time.91 When institutional conditions are 
favorable for acculturation, the evidence suggests that the previously 
identified cognitive and social pressures will encourage compliance 
with social norms. 
Isolating these institutional conditions is more difficult. 
Nevertheless, the microprocesses of acculturation, particularly “social 
impact theory,” suggests two requirements for the effective 
functioning of this mechanism: (1) embedding target actors in an 
institutionalized social setting and (2) institutionalizing at the group 
level preferred forms of identity.92 The general directive is clear: 
change the individual’s connection to the wider cultural community 
or change the content of culturally legitimated practices. The question 
is whether states, like other organizational forms, respond to and are 
in significant part reflections of their wider institutional environment. 
Numerous empirical studies now suggest that states are 
significantly shaped and legitimated through their broader 
organizational environment.93 States are highly legitimated actors in 
 
 89. Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9, at 452 (surveying the literature). 
 90. See generally THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra 
note 9 (explaining the empirical predications of various institutional approaches); see also 
generally Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9, at 443 (providing a general overview of 
institutional theories of organization). 
 91. See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 67, at 115–116. 
 92. Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9, at 453. 
 93. Our approach is “constructivist” in that we emphasize the importance of social 
interaction. We advance the view that state structure, identity, and preferences are constructed 
by social forces. Nevertheless, our approach contrasts with conventional constructivist models in 
two respects: (1) we emphasize top-down processes; and (2) we identify acculturation (rather 
than habitualization and persuasion) as the causal mechanism that drives the emergence and 
diffusion of global scripts. We should emphasize at the outset that our approach avoids two 
common pitfalls in constructivist research. First, our approach is falsifiable in that it generates a 
range of concrete empirical predictions that facilitate the assessment of our approach against 
competing explanations. Second, our approach avoids the circularity problem endemic to some 
constructivist research. Indeed, constructivist research often fails to distinguish adequately 
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world society, and their formal structures (e.g., administrative bodies, 
policy commitments) substantially derive from institutionalized 
models promulgated at the global level.94 These studies generally 
proceed by collecting quantitative data for all available states over 
several decades and employing analytic techniques—including event 
history analysis, regression analysis, and process tracing—to test 
predictions of acculturation. The studies demonstrate that states 
emulate standardized models of structural organization in areas such 
as environmental policy,95 educational curricula,96 militarization,97 the 
laws of war,98 and human rights.99 As many commentators point out, 
the extent of isomorphism across states is remarkable, and it is 
 
between explanatory and outcome variables. The “new institutionalism” that we embrace 
distinguishes between “organizations” and “institutions”: the concept of “organization” refers 
to the formal apparatus (and its purposes), whereas the concept of “institution” refers to all 
regulative and cognitive features of the organizational environment such as rules or shared 
beliefs. Of course, many “institutions” can also be understood as “organizations” depending on 
the object of the study. For example, in a study of the organizational features of hospitals, the 
state (including, perhaps most prominently, regulatory agencies) are part of the institutional 
environment within which hospitals operate. But, in a study of the organizational features of 
state regulatory agencies, it is the agencies themselves that are analyzed as “organizations” (and 
“institutions” in this study would include the salient features of the wider cultural environment 
in which the agencies are embedded). The important point is that our approach avoids 
circularity problems by clearly differentiating, as an analytic matter, explanatory variables 
(institutions) and outcome variables (organizations). See generally SCOTT, supra note 67; 
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8. 
 94. E.g., Meyer et al., supra note 78.  
 95. David John Frank et al., Environmentalism as a Global Institution, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 
122, 122–26 (2000) [hereinafter Frank et al., Environmentalism]; David John Frank et al., The 
Nation-State and the Natural Environment over the Twentieth Century, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 96, 
100–03 (2000) [hereinafter Frank et al., The Nation-State]. 
 96. John W. Meyer, Introduction to JOHN W. MEYER ET AL., SCHOOL KNOWLEDGE FOR 
THE MASSES: WORLD MODELS AND NATIONAL PRIMARY CURRICULAR CATEGORIES IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 1–2 (1992); see also John W. Meyer et al., World Expansion of Mass 
Education, 1870–1980, 65 SOC. EDUC. 128, 131–32 (1992) [hereinafter Meyer et al., World 
Expansion of Mass Education].  
 97. E.g., Dana P. Eyre & Mark C. Suchman, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of 
Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 79, 86–87 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 
1996).  
 98. E.g., Martha Finnemore, Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red Cross 
and the Restraint of State Violence, in CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL 
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875, at 149 (John Boli & George M. Thomas 
eds., 1999).  
 99. See infra notes 102–08 (discussing norm diffusion with respect to human rights 
standards). 
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seemingly inexplicable without reference to acculturation processes.100 
Importantly, the studies do not suggest that this structural 
convergence reflects actual practices or effects on the ground.101 On 
the contrary, the convergence (across states) is accompanied by 
substantial and persistent “decoupling” (within states): official 
purposes and formal structure are disconnected from functional 
demands. Rather than correlating with local task demands, structural 
attributes and official goals of the state correlate in important ways 
with attributes and goals of other states in the world. 
With respect to human rights, extensive research identifies these 
patterns of norm diffusion in fundamental areas of governance 
including welfare and labor policy,102 civil rights guarantees,103 and 
public order maintenance.104 For example, the number of constitutions 
that include provisions committed to the state management of 
childhood and the right to education has increased dramatically.105 A 
study of every national constitution in effect during the 1870–1970 
 
 100. Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 144–45; see David John Frank et al., What Counts As 
History: A Cross-National and Longitudinal Study of University Curricula, 44 COMP. EDUC. 
REV. 29, 31–32 (2000) (considering “the ways in which world models of ‘society’ underlie 
changes in university history curricula”). See generally CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE, 
supra note 98 (presenting a series of articles on this topic by various authors). Indeed, 
“institutionalists would expect roughly contemporaneous global change, regardless of objective 
technological conditions.” Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from 
Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 338 (1996). 
 101. Meaningful change, however, becomes possible as the incorporated elements of global 
culture accumulate. Several of the examples discussed below represent important success 
stories: women’s suffrage, childhood education, and decolonization. See supra note 96 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 109–18, 126 and accompanying text. Our point here is only that 
global diffusion patterns and rates do not correlate with individual state preferences. 
 102. Andrew Abbott & Stanley DeViney, The Welfare State as Transnational Event: 
Evidence from Sequences of Policy Adoption, 16 SOC. SCI. HIST. 245, 266 (1992); David Strang 
& Patricia Mei Yin Chang, The International Labor Organization and the Welfare State: 
Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending, 1960–80, 47 INT’L ORG. 235, 235 (1993); 
George M. Thomas & Pat Lauderdale, State Authority and National Welfare Programs in the 
World System Context, 3 SOC. FORUM 383, 383 (1988). 
 103. John Boli, Human Rights or State Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of 
Constitutional Rights, 1870–1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE, 
SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 78, at 72–73; see also David John Frank & 
Elizabeth H. McEneaney, The Individualization of Society and the Liberalization of State 
Policies on Same-Sex Sexual Relations, 1984–1995, 77 SOC. FORCES 911–12 (1999). 
 104. CONNIE L. MCNEELY, CONSTRUCTING THE NATION-STATE: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION AND PRESCRIPTIVE ACTION 55–57 (1995); Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 158.  
 105. John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, The Ideology of Childhood and the State: Rules 
Distinguishing Children in National Constitutions, 1870–1970, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 797, 804 tbl.1 
(1978). 
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period shows that the adoption of such constitutional provisions over 
time does not correlate with local forms of social organization (such 
as urbanization and national wealth) or with technical capacities of 
the relevant states.106 Moreover, each group of newly established 
states shows a significantly higher probability of adopting such 
constitutional provisions than the preceding group of entrants.107 The 
overall findings suggest that “[n]ational constitutions do not simply 
reflect processes of internal development,” but rather “reflect 
legitimating ideas dominant in the world system at the time of their 
creation.”108 
Consider, also, state convergence with respect to women’s rights. 
A leading study uses sophisticated analytic techniques to examine 
state definitions of political citizenship over a hundred-year period.109 
According to the study, once universal suffrage became a legitimating 
principle associated with the modern nation-state, state enactment of 
women’s suffrage followed a pattern anticipated by theories of 
acculturation.110 After an initial stage of early adopters, the number of 
states providing women the right to vote increased steeply and 
included most states before the rate of adoption tapered off; the 
likelihood that a state would adopt women’s suffrage correlated with 
world trend lines; and adoption correlated far less with domestic 
political conditions once isomorphism took hold.111 Additionally, an 
important finding indicates a “contagion” effect: once the norm was 
institutionalized, a strong predictor for whether an individual state 
would enact women’s suffrage was whether other states in its region 
had done so in the past five years.112 The overall findings suggest that, 
compared with local conditions such as the strength of domestic 
women’s rights groups, “[c]ountries apparently are affected much less 
strongly by internal factors and much more strongly by shifts in the 
international logic of political citizenship.”113 
 
 106. Id. at 807–09. 
 107. Id. at 805. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Francisco O. Ramirez et al., The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-
National Acquisition of Women’s Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 735, 738–39 
(1997) (using event history analysis). 
 110. Id. at 743. 
 111. Id. at 741–42 & tbl.1. 
 112. Id. at 740. 
 113. Id. at 742. 
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These results are consistent with observations in other areas of 
women’s rights. For example, a separate study of states in the western 
hemisphere examines how these governments made roughly 
contemporaneous commitments to eradicate violence against 
women.114 Within a relatively short time span, “[n]early all American 
states . . . created national women’s councils that include[d] domestic 
violence problems among their priorities, . . . approved legal changes 
that define[d] domestic violence as a crime, . . . launched educational 
campaigns to combat the problem, and . . . created social services for 
victims.”115 States also made these advances uniformly; no one state 
substantially exceeded, or distinguished itself from, the average set of 
commitments.116 The extent of this isomorphism despite wide 
variations in national-level political, cultural, and social conditions is 
remarkable. Specifically, once the obligation to address domestic 
violence was institutionalized at the regional level, states joined the 
bandwagon despite dramatic differences in women’s political power 
or access to economic resources at the national level.117 Indeed, the 
study concludes that, at this stage of institutionalization, 
“international socialization is more important than domestic politics” 
in getting “nonconformist states to change their policies to meet the 
standards of new international norms.”118 
In general, the adoption of structural commitments or official 
policy goals in human rights does not necessarily entail concrete 
implementation. On the contrary, when states copy an internationally 
legitimated model that does not fit their local needs, one should 
expect a continued disjuncture between structural isomorphism 
(across states) and technical demands and results (within states). For 
example, the authors of the study of state management of childhood 
“d[o] not argue that constitutional rules in particular countries are 
likely to be ‘implemented,’ but, rather, that prevailing world 
ideologies are likely to be incorporated both ideologically and 
 
 114. Darren Hawkins & Melissa Humes, Human Rights and Domestic Violence, 117 POL. 
SCI. Q. 231, 235 (2002). 
 115. Id. at 234; see also id. at 235 (finding that the states “share important similarities in the 
ways in which they identify national goals, institutionalize guidelines and procedures . . . and 
outline programs to prevent abuse and to treat victims”). 
 116. Id. at 234; see also id. at 234–35 (discussing other comparative studies). 
 117. Id. at 255–56. 
 118. Id. at 256. 
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organizationally.”119 The fact that local social and economic drivers do 
not explain when states adopt the observed constitutional provisions, 
and the fact that adoption of such constitutional guarantees does not 
correlate with technical capacities to implement the provisions, 
suggest that decoupling might persist. Similarly, the study of domestic 
violence finds that many of the official commitments remain 
“woefully underfunded”120 and that subsequent implementation of 
these programs “is still unclear.”121 Indeed, as explained above with 
respect to the sociology of organizations in general, the theory of 
acculturation predicts cross-national isomorphism irrespective of local 
circumstances.122 Because these models have developed universal 
authority and legitimacy, states follow the global scripts as members 
of world society despite the ineffectiveness (or even dysfunctionality) 
of resultant organizational forms. 
We maintain that the evidence of structural isomorphism and 
decoupling discredit theories that explain state behavior solely in 
terms of global power politics. To clarify why this is so, we consider 
an important alternative explanation. Specifically, critics might accept 
that the empirical evidence indicates an external source of state 
organizational formation but might argue that the external source 
could be powerful actors compelling states through material penalties 
or rewards to adopt particular practices. This account, however, is 
unpersuasive. First, although one would assume that poorer countries 
are more susceptible to such external coercion, the empirical studies 
discussed above show that norm adoption does not correlate with the 
economic wealth or development of countries.123 Second, this 
explanation would predict that mimicry (and, hence, isomorphism) 
would vary depending on the presence, power, and influence of 
relevant audiences. Substantial evidence, however, shows that 
isomorphism will frequently occur regardless of whether there is 
external political pressure to conform. For example, governments 
follow global scripts concerning the proper orientation of state policy 
 
 119. John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, Constitutions as Ideology, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 525, 
526 (1980); cf. Boli-Bennett & Meyer, supra note 105, at 809 (“[P]olitical ideologies defining the 
state as responsible for childhood . . . . are worldwide creatures most fully expressed in 
societies . . . where the general depiction of the state as ultimately responsible for social life and 
social progress is strongest.”). 
 120. Hawkins & Humes, supra note 114, at 236. 
 121. Id. at 257. 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 89–92. 
 123. See sources cited supra notes 83–100.  
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toward children—even though powerful states do not exhibit a strong 
interest in monitoring or forcing others to adopt such an ideology.124 
Third, powerful states are often late adopters in some issue areas, 
including human rights law.125 Fourth, counterhegemonic norms 
exhibit the same pattern of diffusion as prohegemonic norms, 
suggesting that conventional conceptions of global power politics 
provide an inadequate descriptive account. One important example is 
the norm of self-determination (understood as a fundamental human 
right), which supported decolonization and motivated many 
indigenous rights campaigns.126 Finally, the coercion explanation 
cannot account for persistent decoupling; there is no convincing 
theory to explain why formal policy convergence without effective 
implementation on the ground would appease powerful states.127 
 
 124. See, e.g., Boli-Bennett & Meyer, supra note 105, at 810. Professors Boli-Bennett and 
Meyer’s study discusses the state’s differentiation of childhood as a distinct life phase and state 
management of childhood in spheres such as criminal justice, education, family, and labor 
between 1870 and 1970. Id. at 797–98, 804. Notably, even in the area of child labor, which one 
might think is a matter of high politics, the institutionalization of global practices occurred 
before powerful states became seriously involved at the international level. See, e.g., Bozena 
Maria Celek, Note, The International Response to Child Labor in the Developing World: Why 
Are We Ineffective?, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 87, 91 (2004) (“States ignored the issue 
and instead concentrated their discussions on the industrial developments of Europe and North 
America—nations where child labor hardly was as prevalent as in the developing states. This 
trend of neglecting child labor issues continued until approximately 1973 . . . .”) (citing Hugh 
Cunningham, The Rights of the Child and the Wrongs of Child Labor: A Historical Perspective, 
in 13 CHILD LABOR: POLICY OPTIONS 20, 21 (Kristoffel Lieten & Ben White eds., 2001)).  
 125. See, e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 33, at 895–96 (describing global diffusion of 
women’s suffrage and highlighting that global hegemons were late adopters); see also Ramirez 
et al., supra note 109, at 737–38.  
 126. See David Strang, From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of 
Decolonization 1870–1987, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 846, 847–48 (1990) (“By 1960 . . . decolonization 
itself had delegitimated imperialism, as ex-dependencies . . . proclaimed the right of self-
determination . . . .”); David Strang, Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500–1987, 35 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 429, 442 (1991) (noting that “[p]rior decolonization . . . added to global understandings 
of the legitimacy and inevitability of decolonization”). 
 127. Another approach might emphasize the rationality of mimicry as a signal to domestic 
and international audiences—irrespective of whether the global script produces results on the 
ground. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at S121 
(attempting to reconcile rational choice theory with nations’ use of rhetoric and, in particular, to 
explain why “self-interested nations would use moral and legal rhetoric, even though they are 
not motivated by a desire to comply with moral or legal obligations”). Although the predictions 
of this approach track our own in many respects, two points of disagreement bear mentioning. 
First, the signaling story does not adequately account for isomorphism and decoupling. 
Assuming that domestic and international audiences learn, the credibility of the mimicry signal 
will substantially degrade over time in an environment characterized by decoupling. In other 
words, the signaled audiences should learn that formal mimicry is often decoupled from 
concrete change on the ground. As a consequence, the value of formal mimicry, without 
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One remaining question is whether the conditions favorable to 
acculturation are amenable to manipulation to promote change 
through institutions. Drawing on institutional theories of the state, we 
maintain that they are. First, significant empirical evidence shows that 
increased institutionalization of a model at the global level is followed 
by its diffusion across states.128 Second, the empirical research also 
shows that a state’s degree of integration in world society is a strong 
predictor of whether that state will adopt global cultural scripts.129 
Accordingly, we submit that embedding target actors in social settings 
organized around highly institutionalized, broadly shared principles 
could foster the basic elements necessary for acculturation.130 Under 
these conditions, states would likely value their status in the group 
(“identify” with, or mimic, the group)—exploiting the cognitive and 
social pressures described above.131 
This evidence demonstrates, at a high level of generality, that 
states respond to cultural forces. Less clear is how exactly this occurs. 
The evidence described above does not document a specific causal 
pathway by which culture influences state action. Although we 
consider this issue an important one that requires rigorous empirical 
testing, the claims made in this Article do not rely upon any particular 
theory about how acculturation occurs. Our claims are not predicated 
on a tacit theory of domestic political economy. Indeed, the empirical 
record to date is consistent with a number of possible causal routes: 
government representatives or high-level policymakers might be 
directly acculturated;132 members of special interest groups might be 
acculturated and they, in turn, might persuade domestic audiences (or 
 
effective implementation, should erode over time. Second, this approach would predict that 
mimicry (and, hence, isomorphism) would vary depending on the presence, power, and 
influence of relevant audiences. Our approach, on the other hand, predicts isomorphism 
irrespective of whether there is political pressure to conform. See generally Goodman & Jinks, 
supra note 8. 
 128. Frank et al., The Nation-State, supra note 95, at 110–11. 
 129. Id. at 106; Meyer et al., World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870–1980, supra note 96, 
at 146. 
 130. This is a necessary predicate of acculturation in any meaningful sense. See, e.g., 
Johnston, supra note 5, at 501 (pointing out that the effectiveness of acculturation processes 
“hinges . . . on an intersubjectively agreed upon notion of what socially valuable behavior looks 
like”).  
 131. Id. at 506. 
 132. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 35, at 147 (considering the “impact of international 
institutions on domestic (in this case foreign–policy related) agencies and actors”). 
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political leaders) to adopt socially legitimated practices;133 or perhaps, 
in some cases, relevant domestic audiences might be directly 
acculturated by broader social forces, and these audiences, in turn, 
might coerce (or persuade) their political leaders to comply with 
social norms.134 We are, for the purposes of this Article, agnostic 
about which of these theories best accounts for the observed behavior 
of states. Irrespective of the specific causal pathway, we maintain that 
observed state behavior is, to a nontrivial degree, the product of 
acculturation. The following Parts also illustrate that fundamental 
issues of institutional design turn on processes at this level of 
abstraction.  
TABLE 1. THREE MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE ON STATES 
 In the balance of the Article, we analyze three regime design 
problems in human rights law: (1) conditional membership in 
 
 133. See, e.g., Risse & Sikkink, supra note 24, at 5 (arguing that networks of domestic and 
transnational actors “empower and legitimate the claims of domestic opposition groups against 
norm-violating governments”). 
 134. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 16–25 (describing this causal pathway in 
context of human rights networks in Latin America). 
 Coercion Persuasion Acculturation 
Basis of 
Influence Interest 
Congruence with 
values 
Social expectations 
Cultural identity 
Behavioral 
Logic 
Instrumentalism Active assessment of 
the validity of a rule 
Social role 
Social status 
Mimicry 
Forms of 
Influence 
Material rewards 
and punishment 
Framing 
Cuing to think 
harder 
Convincing 
Teaching 
Social rewards and 
punishment (shaming, 
shunning, back-patting) 
Cognitive costs and 
benefits (orthodoxy, 
dissonance) 
Result Compliance Acceptance Conformity 
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organizations, (2) precision of obligations, and (3) monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. Two primary points follow from this 
analysis. First, regime design principles for each issue vary 
substantially across the identified behavioral logics. In short, 
mechanisms matter for regime design. Second, the previously 
undertheorized acculturation mechanism yields many regime design 
recommendations that defy conventional wisdom in international law. 
For example, the deinstitutionalizing effects of many traditional 
“hard law” devices would, we claim, diminish the compliance-
inducing effects of acculturation. Our analysis of these regime design 
problems is summarized in a table at the end of each Part. 
II. CONDITIONAL MEMBERSHIP 
An important choice in designing human rights regimes involves 
deciding between an inclusive or restrictive membership rule in 
multilateral organizations.135 Whether membership should be 
conditioned on compliance with particular human rights standards is 
the subject of an ongoing debate among governmental actors, 
practitioners, and scholars. An inclusive approach would allow all 
comers to join the organization and would place negligible conditions 
on maintaining membership status. In contrast, a restrictive approach 
would reject candidate states or expel member states that do not meet 
particular human rights standards. For example, two supranational 
organizations—the United Nations (U.N.)136 and the Council of 
Europe137—have formally adopted a restrictive rule. The goals and 
 
 135. See Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 
INT’L ORG. 761, 770 (2001) (“Who belongs to the institution? Is membership exclusive and 
restrictive, like the G-7’s limitation to rich countries? Or is it inclusive by design, like the 
UN? . . . Membership has been one of the most hotly contested issues in recent years.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 136. The U.N. Charter formally allows the organization to function in a restrictive manner, 
but these powers have remained largely dormant in practice. Specific articles provide for the 
exclusion of applicant states, see U.N. CHARTER art. 4, suspension of membership privileges, see 
id. art. 5, and complete expulsion from the organization, see id. art. 6. Cf. LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
COVENANT art. 1, para. 2 (providing for the exclusion of applicant states from the League of 
Nations); id. art. 16, para. 4 (providing for expulsion from the League of Nations). 
 137. In 1993, the Council adopted a resolution essentially limiting the provision of observer 
status to democratic states. See Observer Status, Eur. Comm. of Ministers, 92d Sess., Stat. Res. 
(93) 26 (May 14, 1993), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/ 
Resol9326.htm. In 1994, the Council required applicant states to abolish the death penalty as a 
precondition for full membership. Abolition of Capital Punishment, Eur. Parl. Ass., 25th Sitting, 
Res. 1044 (Oct. 4, 1994), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ 
ta94/ERES1044.htm. In 2001, the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution 
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activities of these organizations include issues other than human 
rights. Their membership rules, however, have inspired recent 
proposals for human rights regimes. It is this debate—whether to 
condition membership in exclusively human rights regimes on human 
rights performance—that we consider in depth. 
The two principal global human rights forums—international 
human rights treaties138 and the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights139—are currently modeled on an inclusive approach. Both 
institutions formally allow the equal participation of liberal and 
illiberal states. However, scholars suggest that the major international 
human rights treaties should limit admission to states that already 
comply with particular human rights standards and should expel 
members that do not comply with terms of the treaty.140 These 
 
“call[ing] into question the continuing Observer status of Japan and the United States with the 
Organisation as a whole, should no significant progress” toward abolition of the death penalty 
occur. See Abolition of the Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer States, Eur. Parl. Ass., 
17th Sitting, Res. 1253 (June 25, 2001), available at http://assembly.coe.int/documents/ 
adoptedtext/ta01/eres1253.htm. 
 138. There are six major international human rights treaties. International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 
195; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. 100-
20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 139. The Commission on Human Rights is a suborgan of the U.N. General Assembly. Its 
mandate includes developing standards for the elaboration and codification of international 
human rights law and monitoring and reporting the human rights practices of U.N. member 
states. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights, at 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrintro.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2004) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 140. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 4, at 2024 (“Countries might, for example, be required 
to demonstrate compliance with certain human rights standards before being allowed to join a 
human rights treaty. . . . Or treaties could include provisions for removing countries that are 
habitually found in violation of the terms of the treaty from membership in the treaty regime.”); 
see also Anne F. Bayefsky, Making the Human Rights Treaties Work, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN 
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 229, 264 (Louis Henkin and John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 
1994), available in 26 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 264 (1994) (recommending “[p]utting 
in place written rules for expelling from the treaty regime those states that do not adhere to a 
set of minimum requirements drawn from the treaty’s implementation provisions”). These 
restrictive approaches resemble proposals for excluding illiberal states from transnational legal 
regimes. See Anne-Marie Burley [Slaughter], Law Among Liberal States: Liberal 
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1990 (1992) (proposing 
a new interpretation of the act-of-state doctrine by which “application of the doctrine to bar 
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proposals have spurred an animated discussion within the academy.141 
They have also begun to gain political momentum within other 
forums, in particular the Commission on Human Rights. A wide 
range of actors—including government representatives,142 policy 
analysts,143 activists,144 and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights145—have recently supported the idea of excluding 
states with poor human rights records from membership in the 
Commission. 
Importantly, formal membership rules do not exhaust the range 
of choices confronting regime architects on this issue. States could, as 
several historical examples illustrate, deploy other strategies when 
existing organizational rules do not explicitly permit exclusion. As 
Professor Louis Sohn explains in a leading article on expulsion from 
multilateral organizations, “[a]ll these measures can be taken by 
international organizations, whether or not their own constitutions 
expressly provide for them. In fact, only on a few occasions were the 
measures taken those actually authorized by explicit constitutional 
 
adjudication of the validity of [an] act of a certain state would be a judicial declaration that the 
state in question does not play by liberal rules”).  
 141. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Beyond “Them” and “Us”: Putting Treaty Body Reform into 
Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 501, 502 (Philip 
Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000); Philip Alston, Effective Functioning of Bodies Established 
Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights Instruments: Final Report on Enhancing the Long-
Term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., 
Agenda Item 15, ¶¶ 14–36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1996); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 4, 
at 171–72; Hathaway, supra note 4, at 2020–25. 
 142. See, e.g., U.S. Mission to the European Union, U.S. Deeply Disappointed in Libya’s 
Human Rights Election, at http://www.useu.be/Categories/GlobalAffairs/Jan2003UNUSLibya 
HumanRights.html (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The United States will 
continue to make its position clear. . . . We are convinced that the best way for the Commission 
to ensure the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . is to have a membership 
comprised of countries with strong human rights records at home.”) (quoting Ambassador 
Kevin E. Moley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva)). 
 143. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, UN Human Rights Panel Needs Some Entry Standards, INT’L 
HERALD TRIBUNE, May 14, 2003.  
 144. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, United Nations: Rights Commission Shields Abusers, 
at http://hrw.org/press/2002/04/unhchrfinal.htm (Apr. 26, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (“[A]ny government whose records the Commission has condemned, who have failed 
to implement the Commission’s resolutions, or who have refused to allow visits by the 
Commission’s investigators and experts, should be excluded from membership on the 
commission.”).  
 145. Richard Waddington, Libya Elected to Chair U.N. Human Rights Body, REUTERS, Jan. 
20, 2003 (“U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello has backed 
activists’ calls for conditions to be agreed for Commission membership. These could include 
signing and ratifying all human rights treaties and inviting U.N. special rights investigators to 
visit.”). 
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provisions.”146 Indeed, states have deployed a range of tactics to limit 
the participation of governments with offensive human rights 
practices, including denying access to regional and preparatory 
meetings,147 rejecting credentials required for participation,148 limiting 
voting or speaking rights,149 and adopting extraordinary resolutions 
tantamount to expulsion (e.g., “advising” a member state to 
withdraw).150 These measures often serve as the functional equivalent 
of formal conditions on membership. Although we discuss only 
formal membership rules, our analysis generally applies to these 
informal measures as well.151 
Before we proceed to that analysis, it is also important to note 
that other design features may raise some, though not all, of the  
same considerations. First, procedural or substantive terms of a treaty 
may produce significant exclusionary effects. It is well  
understood that higher standards in a human rights treaty tend to 
reduce levels of state participation. For instance, in drafting the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court, negotiators adopted 
strong procedural and substantive provisions that effectively 
sacrificed the participation of particular governments.152 As other 
 
 146. Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1421 (1964). 
 147. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 71–72 (discussing measures involving the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, and South 
Africa). 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 74 (discussing the World Meteorological Organization’s rejection of 
South Africa’s credentials); Sohn, supra note 146, at 1401–04 (discussing the exclusion of Spain 
from several U.N. specialized agencies). 
 149. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 71–72 (discussing the World Health Organization 
and South Africa). 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 80–81 (discussing the Organization of American States and Cuba); id. at 
71 (discussing the International Labor Organization and South Africa); Sohn, supra note 146, at 
1409–12 (discussing the Economic and Social Council and Portugal).  
 151. Aspects of our discussion also apply to strategies by which individual governments and 
nongovernmental organizations might encourage illiberal states to join human rights regimes. 
For example, governments and organizations should consider the institutionalizing effects of 
universal membership in determining whether to emphasize the strategy of pressuring illiberal 
states to ratify human rights treaties. Similarly, an understanding of these effects should inform 
decisions about whether to pressure illiberal states to leave international organizations (e.g., 
African states’ boycotting intergovernmental organizations that allowed South African 
participation). See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 71, 73 (discussing several African 
countries’ threats to boycott the United Postal Union.). 
 152. See, e.g., Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the 
Struggle for the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85 
(Sarah B. Sewell & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000); Trigger Mechanisms and Accountability, 10 INT’L 
CRIM. CT. MONITOR (NGO Coalition for an Int’l Criminal Court, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 1998, 
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commentators demonstrate,153 these design choices may be 
understood as membership rules. 
Second, administrative rules applied in the course of managing a 
human rights regime may also implicate the scope of membership. 
Consider, for example, the controversy over the appropriate remedy 
for invalid treaty reservations.154 Proposals include severing the 
reservation and thus keeping the state bound to the treaty, or 
nullifying the entire act of ratification.155 Although this debate is 
complex, the effect of each proposal on treaty membership weighs 
heavily in any systematic evaluation of these options.156 Indeed, the 
very idea that some reservations should be deemed invalid is justified 
as the best way to promote universal membership without sacrificing 
the integrity of the underlying treaty norms.157 Another administrative 
question concerns the criteria used for accreditation of governmental 
 
at 5 (discussing the history of the negotiations at the treaty conference), available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/publications/monitor/10/monitor10.199811.pdf.  
 153. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 429 (2000) (describing the use of hard law as functionally “an 
ex ante sorting device”); George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of International 
Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465, 500 & 
n.123 (2000) (analyzing stronger obligations as effectively a restrictive membership approach in 
environment, trade, and arms control agreements).  
 154. A reservation is a formal condition that a state makes when ratifying a treaty, whereby 
the state purports to exclude or modify its obligations under the treaty. See Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333. 
Commentators hold a range of opinions on the subject of severing invalid reservations. See 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 
U. PA. L. REV. 399, 402 (2000) (rejecting severability and challenging the “conventional 
academic wisdom concerning both the legality and desirability of [reservations, understandings, 
and declarations] attached to human rights treaties” and arguing that reservations “reflect a 
sensible accommodation of competing domestic and international considerations”); Ryan 
Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 
531, 531 (2002) (advocating for the severability of certain treaty reservations, but noting strong 
opposition to this position by a number of commentators); cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile 
Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 509–11 (2002) (discussing the 
severability of the United States’ juvenile death penalty reservation to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Catherine Redgwell, US Reservations to Human Rights 
Treaties: All for One and None for All?, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392, 399–400 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 
2003) (discussing possible responses to U.S. reservations to human rights treaties). 
 155. Goodman, supra note 154, at 531; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 154, at 438. 
 156. The selected remedy will also affect whether some states are willing to consent to 
human rights treaties in the first place. See Goodman, supra note 154, at 535–55. 
 157. See Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) (noting the traditional rule 
considering reservations to multilateral treaties invalid unless accepted by all parties).  
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delegations in international forums—for example, whether to seat a 
democratically elected government in exile or a nondemocratic 
government with effective control of a country.158 Again, this is a 
thorny problem, but deciding which approach is optimal will turn, in 
part, on the expected functions of membership rules and the effect 
desired from exclusion.159 The important point is that an empirical 
question inheres in these doctrinal problems: what are the 
consequences of restrictive membership? The following discussion 
examines the empirical foundations of membership rules. For the 
sake of clarity, we focus on rules that directly restrict—either through 
denial of admission or through expulsion—membership on the basis 
of human rights performance. 
Our analysis of the three mechanisms of social influence is 
relevant to the debate over conditional membership in several 
respects. First, the social mechanism that one emphasizes (or tries to 
harness) might dictate whether and how to condition membership. 
Second, close attention to social processes clarifies the trade-offs that 
would accompany specific membership rules. Third, the social 
mechanism that one emphasizes also implicates various second-order 
determinations. For example, if one adopted a restrictive approach, 
each of the mechanisms would suggest unique design principles with 
respect to the substantive criteria and procedures for selecting, 
retaining, or ousting members. 
A. Coercion 
Coercion suggests two approaches to the restrictive membership 
issue. On one view, whether states act within or outside a regime 
should not substantially affect the ability of stronger states to exert 
influence over delinquent, weaker states.160 Another view is that high 
 
 158. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 539, 605 (1992). 
 159. Inclusion of the de facto (but illegitimate) government signals acceptance of its 
authority—and perhaps imbues it with some measure of legitimacy. See id. Exclusion, on the 
other hand, might sacrifice some measure of influence over nondemocratic governments. Id. at 
605–06 (evaluating the claim that the General Assembly’s use of its accreditation power to 
recognize democratically elected governments would cause it to “lose any leverage it might have 
to influence the policies of excluded unelected governments”). 
 160. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT’L 
SECURITY, Winter 1994–95, at 5, 7 (“[International] institutions have minimal influence on state 
behavior . . . .”); see also Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist 
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 486–87 (1988).  
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levels of regime participation can yield nontrivial benefits: regimes 
help generate information about the distribution of state preferences, 
develop reputations for compliance, and lower the transaction costs 
of cooperation.161 These effects promote stable cooperative 
arrangements in part because they facilitate the efficient allocation of 
rewards and penalties.162 
The benefits of inclusion, however, must be weighed against the 
benefits of a restrictive rule. Restrictive membership might yield two 
advantages for effective coercion. First, conditioning admission on 
performance has an information-forcing effect. Several leading 
commentators accordingly hypothesize that rational regime designers 
are more likely to adopt a restrictive membership rule under 
conditions of uncertainty about state preferences: “Membership 
enables states to learn about each others’ preferences if the 
membership mechanism can distinguish cooperators from non-
cooperators. . . . Effective membership rules create a separating 
equilibrium where only those who share certain characteristics will 
bear the costs necessary to be included in an equilibrium.”163 
Assuming that such information is valued, rational regime designers 
should weigh (1) the information produced by a high admissions bar 
against (2) the information produced by lowering the bar (i.e., 
 
 161. KEOHANE, supra note 28, at 244–45; Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The 
Promise of Institutionalist Theory, INT’L SECURITY, Summer 1995, 39, 46–50. In accordance with 
this neoinstitutionalist view, a regime should emphasize measures such as reporting 
requirements and repeat interactions to help develop reputations.  
 162. We have isolated the different causal mechanisms for theoretical reasons explained 
above. See supra Part I. Note, however, that, if legitimacy is also an empirically meaningful 
variable, inclusive membership may bolster the effectiveness of coercive power. Specifically, 
some scholars who argue for the coercion paradigm (for example, some neorealists) accept that 
legitimacy is a component of power. On this view, the use of sanctions against a state that 
violates human rights may be more legitimate, and thus more effective, if the target state has 
formally acceded to the relevant human rights obligations.  
 163. Koremenos et al., supra note 135, at 784; see also id. (“When the price of membership is 
too low, membership is not informative.”); Barbara Koremenos et al., Rational Design: Looking 
Back to Move Forward, 55 INT’L ORG. 1051, 1056–57 (2001) (discussing results of contributions 
to the special issue that support this conjecture); cf. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 429 
(“[S]tates should find hard law of special value when forming ‘clubs’ of sincerely committed 
states . . . . Here legalization functions as an ex ante sorting device: because hard legal 
commitments impose greater costs on violators, a willingness to make them identifies one as 
having a low propensity to defect.”). 
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allowing more states to participate in the intraregime organizational 
processes that generate information over time).164 
Second, restricting membership to states with better human 
rights records might facilitate deep cooperation among regime 
participants. Professor George Downs et al. define the depth of an 
agreement as “the extent to which [the agreement] requires states to 
depart from what they would have done in its absence.”165 These 
scholars stress the utility of coercive tools in ensuring cooperation 
among states,166 and they contend that only states strongly committed 
to regime principles would ratify treaties requiring deep change.167 
Naturally, they conclude that cooperative international regimes 
should restrict membership to states that are prepared to undertake 
substantial obligations.168 It is unclear, however, whether this 
reasoning applies to human rights treaties because Professor Downs 
et. al. developed the theory in the context of environmental regimes. 
As we describe in the Introduction, human rights regimes do not fit 
neatly into cooperative models—there is no clear “free rider” 
problem, and states can, in a nontrivial sense, ensure human rights 
domestically without the cooperation of other states.169 As a 
 
 164. After one weighs the benefits of inclusion with the benefits of a restrictive rule, it 
becomes difficult to see why a rational institutional designer would invariably, or at least 
usually, favor restrictive membership under conditions of uncertainty. 
 165. George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996); see also Guzman, supra note 6, at 1854–57. 
 166. Downs et al., supra note 165, at 386, 391. 
 167. See, e.g., id. at 399: 
One possible strategy is to restrict regime membership to states that will not have to 
defect very often. The idea is that whatever benefit is lost by excluding such states 
from the regime will be more than made up by permitting those that are included to 
set and also enforce a deeper level of cooperation . . . . 
 168. Cf. Downs et al., supra note 153, at 508: 
[T]he maximum amount of cooperation is likely to be achieved through the creation 
of a noninclusive regime that contains a majority of the most cooperatively 
progressive states. Such regimes tend to establish an initial level of cooperation that is 
relatively deep, whereas a more inclusive regime in which the average state had yet to 
be affected . . . would do little or nothing. 
 169. One might incorrectly think that Professor Downs et al.’s analysis equally applies to 
human rights. Professor Downs et al. do apply their argument to environmental regimes, see id., 
and, at first blush, the environmental context may appear to raise the same concerns as human 
rights: the states least willing to control environmental degradation would be omitted from a 
restrictive regime. However, this is not necessarily the case. In the environmental context, the 
states more willing to join a restrictive regime (“cooperatively progressive” states) may also be 
the states with greater environmental problems (or there may be no association between 
degrading the environment and being a cooperatively progressive state). However, when 
outsiders are the ones most likely to exhibit the problem (environmental degradation, human 
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consequence, the types of costs identified by Professor Downs et al. 
(i.e., increased free riding and the emergence of suboptimal focal 
points) are negligible in the human rights context. 
An additional feature of human rights regimes mitigates the 
concern that breadth trades off with depth. Because human rights 
protection does not require a unified institutional framework, there 
are multiple, overlapping human rights treaty regimes.170 There are no 
fewer than four international human rights regimes: the global regime 
(embodied in the U.N. system and the “International Bill of Rights” 
treaties)171 and three regional systems.172 As a result, states can pursue 
multiple cooperative strategies simultaneously, and the membership 
rules of each regime can be tailored to the specific goals of the treaty 
system in question. Assume, for the sake of argument, that human 
rights treaties solve some collective action problems—an assumption 
that makes plausible Professor Down’s analysis. Liberal states 
committed to “deep” cooperation on human rights issues could 
jointly pursue multiple objectives. To capture the benefits of 
cooperation, such states could establish a separate treaty regime with 
(1) robust substantive commitments and (2) restricted membership. 
To capture the “noncooperative” benefits of constructive 
engagement, these states could also pursue a global regime with (1) 
more modest substantive commitments and (2) unrestricted 
membership.173 
 
rights abuses, etc.), Professor Downs et al.’s argument is less persuasive. Cf. Downs et al., supra 
note 165, at 399 (“The idea is that whatever benefit is lost by excluding such states from the 
regime will be more than made up by permitting those that are included to set and also enforce 
a deeper level of cooperation . . . .”). 
 170. Overlapping, inconsistent rights regimes can coexist because the regulatory problem 
that they address is unidirectional. That is, rights regimes seek to maximize the protection of 
individual rights—subject only to the other necessities of good governance. Rights regimes 
regulate only underprotection of rights, not their overprotection. Consider a stylized example. 
Assume that regime X protects rights at level ten and regime Y protects rights at level five. All 
states willing to protect rights at level ten could lawfully participate in both regimes. 
 171. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 138, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 
95-2, at 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 331; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
supra note 138, 993 U.N.T.S. at 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 172. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
 173. This is an important point because it goes a long way toward dispelling one potential 
problem with our model. As we note in the Introduction, one purpose of international human 
rights regimes is to improve the practices of illiberal states. There are, however, other important 
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If a restrictive approach were adopted, the coercion mechanism 
would suggest particular procedures for applying the membership 
rule. Specifically, it would make sense to design the admission process 
to yield particular types of information. The regime might, for 
example, target information otherwise difficult to detect. Candidate 
states could be required to provide information on death in custody 
or statistics on racially disparate social conditions.174 The important 
point is that the analysis of mechanisms informs not only the decision 
of whether to adopt a restrictive rule but also the determination of 
the most effective means of administering the selected rule. 
B. Persuasion 
Properly considered, persuasion—like coercion—can and does 
occur outside international organizations.175 Treaty regimes do accord, 
however, some structural opportunities for persuasion. Moreover, 
international human rights regimes help liberal states coordinate their 
efforts at persuasive diplomacy. Typically, commentators who 
emphasize the value of persuasion also suggest that membership 
 
objectives of human rights regimes. For example, international rights regimes might empower 
national governments to “lock in” elevated levels of rights protection—allowing national 
leaders to consolidate gains in liberalization and democratization. See Moravcsik, supra note 12, 
at 220 (stating that “governments turn to international enforcement when an international 
commitment effectively enforces the policy preferences of a particular government at a 
particular point in time against future domestic political alternatives”). As the discussion in the 
text suggests, these goals can be pursued within the context of a regional regime—or a regime 
organized around some other salient state characteristic. Indeed, Professor Moravcsik’s 
important study documents how some national governments utilized the European human 
rights regime for this purpose. See id. at 243 (stating that the origins of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms “lie in self-
interested efforts by newly established (or reestablished) democracies”). 
 174. U.N. monitoring bodies have had difficulty acquiring this type of information. See,  
e.g., Michael Banton, The Causes of, and Remedies for, Racial Discrimination, U.N.  
ESCOR Comm. on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/WG.1/BP.6 (1999) 
(explaining difficulties in obtaining data from governments on dimensions of racial 
discrimination), available at http: www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/a0a298536f43dc 
51802567a5005a1d09?Opendocument. 
 175. Some commentators may overestimate the importance of treaty regimes for persuasion. 
See Downs et al., supra note 153, at 495–97 (criticizing scholars for trumpeting processes of 
persuasion within international organizations without considering alternative opportunities for 
persuasion in the wider context). But cf. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 1–38 (describing 
transnational processes of persuasion, including but not limited to formal organizations); Koh, 
supra note 4, at 2656–58 (describing multiple forums and processes apart from international 
organizations); Raustiala, supra note 7, at 10–16 (analyzing the importance of networks outside 
formal organizations and treaties). 
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should be inclusive.176 Broad treaty membership, on this view, would 
lower transaction costs and facilitate opportunities for collective 
deliberation and dialogue. The primary advantage of unrestricted 
membership is that it enmeshes illiberal states in regularized 
communicative processes.177 In addition, the interdisciplinary 
“communicative action” literature suggests that open debate and 
constructive dialogue would push states toward a progressive 
realization of human rights.178 Under this approach, restrictive 
membership rules risk deinstitutionalization by foregrounding 
disagreements without providing a constructive institutional setting in 
which these disagreements could be debated.179 These commentators 
often perceive restrictive rules as crude punitive measures. Professors 
Chayes and Chayes, for example, classify restrictive membership rules 
exclusively within the rubric of “sanctions.”180 Similarly, Professor 
Rodger Payne contends that measures implying “participant rank” 
introduce a wholly undesirable “warping factor” into persuasive 
settings.181 The argument for inclusiveness in this literature, however, 
is often based on the theory that broad-based membership will exert 
stronger and more authoritative “community pressure” on 
recalcitrant states.182 Such a proposition describes (within the four 
corners of our model) the mechanism of acculturation, which involves 
a different set of assumptions and implications. 
On the other hand, the mechanics of persuasion suggest some 
nontrivial advantages of restricted membership. For example, 
exclusion of illiberal states from human rights regimes can promote 
issue salience in those states. This increased salience empowers 
 
 176. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2002); Downs et al., supra note 153, at 477–78 (describing the literature); 
see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 68–69. 
 177. Of course, the nature of the forum would need to foster these types of interactions. 
 178. Risse, supra note 33, at 2; cf. Reus-Smit, supra note 24, at 526.  
 179. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 69 (“[D]isputes about membership necessarily 
imposed costs in terms of regime performance . . . .”); id. at 85 (“The very effort to impose 
sanctions [through membership status], even when it is successful, turns into a major issue, 
disrupts the work of the organization and generates dissatisfaction and resentment among 
supporters as well as opponents of the action.”); cf. Payne, supra note 7, at 41–42 (borrowing 
from Jürgen Habermas in discussing the noxious effects of using coercive tools with ongoing 
processes of persuasion). 
 180. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 68–87. 
 181. Payne, supra note 7, at 47. 
 182. See, e.g., BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 176, at 175 (“These are institutions in  
which community pressure is arguably at its strongest because of their broadly drawn 
membership . . . .”). 
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human rights advocacy networks to shape the local political agenda 
by alerting local actors to these issues and exposing inconsistencies in 
national priorities.183 The important point is that “negative” events—
such as exclusion or expulsion from a human rights regime—can 
inspire the mobilization of social movements.184 
If a restrictive approach were adopted, the mechanics of 
persuasion would also suggest how best to make membership 
determinations. The process initiated by such a membership regime 
would provide multiple opportunities for framing human rights issues. 
For example, membership criteria (and the negotiations that they 
trigger) might target issues, such as indigenous rights or the legality of 
extraterritorial human rights violations, that might not have received 
adequate attention on the international stage. The important 
comparative point is that this negotiating process—which the 
coercion approach simply dismisses as transaction costs185—is, in the 
persuasion approach, an advantage in that it provides structural 
opportunities for productive exchange and teaching. 
C. Acculturation 
Unlike the other two approaches, the acculturation mechanism 
suggests that membership rules are of high importance in regime 
design. According to this view, broad membership would amplify 
social pressure and help substantiate the claim that the principled 
commitments of the regime are, indeed, universal. Moreover, one of 
the principal empirical insights of acculturation studies is that the 
degree to which states are embedded in international organizations is 
strongly associated with the state’s conformity to global models of 
appropriate behavior.186 Participation in international institutions thus 
 
 183. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 24–27. 
 184. William A. Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, 
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 275 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996). 
For example, the European Union’s denial of Turkey’s application for admission might assist 
domestic human rights movements in promoting long-term reforms.  
 185. Our point here is simply that coercion does not value highly the negotiating process 
itself. 
 186. Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s 
Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 328–30 (1996); see Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 173 
(“[W]orld-society models shape nation-state identities, structures, and behavior via worldwide 
cultural and associational processes.”); see also supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text 
(discussing the correlation between states’ international involvement and their adoption of 
global norms). 
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plays a significant role in promoting standardized, socially legitimated 
models of appropriate state behavior.187 Importantly, institutions with 
broad membership advance the social processes by which states adopt 
norms identified with being a “modern state.”188 Accordingly, the 
mechanism of acculturation—unlike coercion and persuasion—
operates much more effectively, and sometimes necessarily, through 
international organizations. 
Acculturation suggests several additional benefits of inclusive 
membership worth mentioning. First, inclusive membership 
encourages illiberal states to define and justify their resistance to 
global norms in terms of the treaty. To guard against retrenchment, 
for example, disputes over rights protection should occur within the 
terms of global models of legitimate state objectives. In practice, 
human rights treaties often contain provisions that delineate 
acceptable governmental restrictions on particular rights, such as 
derogation and limitation clauses.189 The inclusion of illiberal states 
within these frameworks should facilitate the institutionalization of 
globally legitimated restrictions. Exclusion, on the other hand, may 
encourage parochial or idiosyncratic modes of resistance to human 
rights norms. Escape clauses (such as derogation and limitation 
clauses) both encourage state participation in human rights regimes 
and increase the acceptability of various institutionalized forms of 
state reporting and third-party evaluation. Moreover, states can—
through the use of these devices—meaningfully participate in a treaty 
 
 187. FINNEMORE, supra note 34, at 3; Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, 
Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 712–15 (1999). 
 188. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47 INT’L 
ORG. 565, 566, 583–87 (1993) (concluding that the efforts of UNESCO prompted the creation of 
national science bureaucracies in many countries).  
 189. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 138, art. 4(1), 
999 U.N.T.S. at 174 (“In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take 
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation . . . .”); American Convention on Human Rights, 
supra note 172, art. 15, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 149: 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed 
in conformity with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of 
national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals 
or the rights or freedom of others. 
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regime because many state interests (even if idiosyncratic or highly 
controversial) can be expressed within the terms of the treaty.190 
Second, the logic of acculturation, in contrast to the logic of the 
other mechanisms,191 highlights the importance of discouraging certain 
relationships that can arise between organizational insiders and 
outsiders. As a model of culture, acculturation predicts the 
institutionalization of deviance within subcultures that can form 
among outsiders who have been denied access to the dominant 
group.192 Indeed, acculturation studies explain variation among states 
by showing that adherence to dominant norms is associated with 
levels of participation in international organizations.193 Thus, states 
with fewer connections to international bodies (e.g., Burma and 
North Korea) should be more prone to adopt aberrant official 
policies and forms of governance. Furthermore, the forces of social 
pressure and orthodoxy that occur within global institutions can also 
occur within smaller communities—e.g., Asia-Pacific states with low 
participation in international human rights forums—thus propelling 
local standards partly defined in contradistinction to global 
conventions. 
The acculturation approach differs from the other approaches in 
how it evaluates “defections” by states inside the organization. First, 
an acculturation approach predicts certain patterns of defection not 
envisioned by the other approaches, and it thus evaluates the cost of 
defection for regime maintenance very differently. The coercion 
approach, for example, raises the concern that including states with 
lower commitments to regime objectives will prove unworkable due 
 
 190. This suggests an important, and potentially problematic, difference between the 
mechanics of acculturation and persuasion. The acculturation approach is agnostic about the 
“truth-finding” capacities of social interaction. Under the persuasion approach, on the other 
hand, “communicative action” theory suggests (either expressly or impliedly) that greater rights 
protections will emerge from well-structured discourse among states. See Downs et al., supra 
note 153, at 474 (explaining that this area of scholarship appears to consider a set of prescribed 
processes “relentlessly progressive”). The acculturation model instead emphasizes cultural and 
associational factors that shape the definition and mediate the transmission of socially accepted 
behavior. 
 191. Recall that, under the coercion and persuasion approaches, gains to insiders are largely 
absolute and localized; these approaches do not impose costs on outsiders. The organizational 
benefits to insiders do not affect the relationships between insiders and outsiders or the impact 
of exclusion on outsiders’ attitudes or behavior. 
 192. See generally HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
DEVIANCE (1963) (describing the processes of subculture formation among outsiders). 
 193. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between 
states’ international involvement and their adoption of global norms). 
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to frequent defection within the forum.194 The persuasion approach 
predicts that few meaningful defections will occur and considers 
defection in unequivocally unfavorable terms.195 An acculturation 
approach, in contrast, predicts that defections will occur and may be 
somewhat salutary. Specifically, it predicts that pressure to conform 
will produce a particular form of defection: decoupling, in which 
structural adherence to globally institutionalized models does not 
correspond to actual state practices on the ground.196 As we argue 
elsewhere, this disconnect between local circumstances and universal 
models is not an impediment to the diffusion of global norms, as 
other theories would suggest.197 Rather, this form of decoupling, in 
important respects, makes possible the diffusion of global models and 
the resultant convergence of policies and organizational structures. 
The important points here are that the acculturation mechanism 
predicts a peculiar form of defection and that this form of defection 
assists the diffusion of norms. 
The mechanics of acculturation also suggest potential advantages 
to a restrictive rule. First, membership itself can serve as a device for 
affirmation or censure. That is, inclusion can provide a form of back-
patting, whereas exclusion can shame and shun. In a related context, 
Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter advocates calibrating the application of 
doctrines of judicial deference to different forms of government. She 
proposes that national courts exercise jurisdiction over the acts of 
liberal foreign states but abstain from reviewing the acts of illiberal 
ones.198 Dean Slaughter contends that shielding illiberal states from 
judicial scrutiny entails “salving their sovereign sensitivities, but at the 
price of . . . moral ostracism from the liberal community.”199 Indeed, 
her proposal is designed to confer a “badge of alienage” on illiberal 
 
 194. See Downs et al., supra note 165, at 398–99 (discussing “why many deeply cooperative 
regimes have a limited number of members and why regimes with a large number of members 
tend to engage in only shallow cooperation”). 
 195. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 543 (discussing the theory that states 
develop a “sense of obligation” and that “[w]hile instances of non-compliance clearly occur . . . 
they are generally inadvertent”); cf. Downs et al., supra note 165, at 379–80 (criticizing this 
prediction of compliance).  
 196. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 197. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1761. 
 198. See Burley, supra note 140, at 1916–23 (contending that domestic courts’ divergent 
treatment of liberal and illiberal foreign states would create a “zone of law” in relation to liberal 
states and a “zone of politics” in relation to illiberal states).  
 199. Id. at 1991. 
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states and a “badge of legitimacy” on liberal states.200 Although 
substantial empirical evidence now suggests that these categories are 
socially meaningful, Dean Slaughter does not consider countervailing 
effects within the terms of the same social logic. That is, the same 
body of empirical work provides strong reasons for bringing 
recalcitrant states into the fold. Specifically, as discussed above, 
processes of assimilation suggest that illiberal states will begin to 
imitate the group in which they are included.201 This “identification” 
with a group—not banishment from the group—is perhaps more 
likely to propel the legal and political systems of illiberal states 
toward conformity with prevailing norms.202 
Second, the acculturation approach suggests that restrictive 
membership might foster greater affinity among insiders—thus 
accelerating processes of norm diffusion within a group. The social 
meaning of exclusivity—created by the restriction itself—should 
intensify forms of identification. And, if the substantive criteria for 
membership include human rights performance, identification is 
likely to develop along the axis of that defining criterion. However, 
such dynamics improve the situation only for states willing and able 
to join an organization. Although we discussed a similar difficulty 
with the coercion approach (in which gains only accrue to insiders),203 
this result is especially problematic in the context of acculturation. 
Widening disparities between insiders and outsiders might culminate 
in standards that are unrealistically high for illiberal states, 
diminishing substantially the probability that these states will identify 
with insiders. 
Finally, substantial evidence from social psychology suggests that 
small groups often facilitate processes of acculturation. The literature 
often describes this effect as “persuasion,” but the mechanics of this 
social process mirror what we call “acculturation.”204 In discussing 
international institutions, for example, Professor Iain Johnston notes 
that “ideal persuasion is likely to be the most prevalent and powerful 
 
 200. Id. at 1990–92. 
 201. See supra Part I.C.1.  
 202. As we note above, Dean Slaughter’s project on transgovernmentalism relies centrally 
on notions of persuasion. See supra note 7.  
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 165–73 (explaining that, under the coercion 
approach, restrictive membership facilitates deeper cooperation among insiders only). 
 204. This is yet another important example of the literature’s conceptual slippage along the 
persuasion/acculturation divide. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25 (describing this 
conceptual slippage at an abstract level). 
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socialization process when membership is small (social liking and in-
group identity effects on the persuasiveness of counterattitudinal 
messages are strongest).”205 Notwithstanding the persuasion label, this 
view clearly suggests that small group size promotes acculturation 
because small groups are more likely to foster intimate, high-affect 
exchanges.206 Regimes with restricted membership, therefore, should 
facilitate the convergence of practices.207 The degree to which this 
insight is applicable to human rights treaty regimes, however, is 
questionable. The identified advantages issue only from the size of 
the group. As such, the social psychology literature is nonspecific and 
offers no guidance on any other defining characteristic of 
membership regimes. For example, the “small-group” effect does not 
necessarily support the view that regime members should be selected 
on the basis of human rights performance; in fact, if it did, 
acculturation would prove most effective when needed least—in the 
case of high performance states. In addition, persuasive encounters—
such as bilateral or trilateral diplomatic exchanges—may occur in 
small-group settings irrespective of the size of the treaty regime writ 
large. 
On balance, the features of acculturation support inclusive 
membership. However, if a restrictive rule were adopted, the 
principles of acculturation would favor particular criteria in applying 
the rule. First, the acculturation approach would suggest requiring 
only a de minimis demonstration of human rights performance. 
Second, qualifying criteria for new entrants might be used to 
encourage candidate states to establish institutional arrangements 
fostering subsequent structural opportunities for the diffusion of 
global norms. The acculturation literature suggests that particular 
 
 205. Johnston, supra note 5, at 509. 
 206. In other words, this design feature—small groups—induces social conformity through 
affiliation and identification with other participants, not through deliberation on the content of 
the exchange. Just as it is possible that such affiliation and identification could set the stage for 
more effective persuasion, so might the tools of coercion set the stage for more effective 
persuasion. The important point is not to commit the conceptual error of confusing the tools 
that set the stage from activities that then take place on the stage. 
 207. Professor Johnston risks the same framing error that we discuss with respect to the 
coercion paradigm. See supra notes 165–73 and accompanying text. That is, focusing on 
institutional effectiveness in this manner displaces the wider regime and has implications for 
excluded states. An exclusionary organization may enhance the social environment for insiders. 
But, especially with respect to human rights, one should weigh the advantages of significantly 
enhanced effectiveness for member states against the advantages of lowering the bar and 
allowing more states to benefit from—overall less effective—participation. 
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domestic arrangements can (unintentionally) accelerate diffusion by 
providing “domestic receptor sites” for international norms.208 For 
example, Professor David John Frank et al. show that domestic 
natural science associations and environmental institutes facilitate the 
local transmission of global models of environmentalism.209 In the 
context of international human rights, national human rights 
commissions are a close analogue.210 Hence, admission to the 
intergovernmental organization might be conditioned on (or highly 
favor) establishing such national institutions. In a similar vein, an 
intergovernmental organization could require or encourage candidate 
states to establish a human rights ombudsman or a human rights unit 
in the foreign ministry to interface with the international 
organization. The basic idea would be to promote institutional 
arrangements that, according to the behavioral logic of acculturation, 
should produce a multiplier effect in the transmission and diffusion of 
human rights norms. 
 
 208. Frank et al., The Nation-State, supra note 95, at 96 n.1 (“Receptor sites are social 
structures (e.g., scientific institutes) with the capacity to receive, decode, and transmit signals 
from the world society to national actors.”); see also Frank et al., Environmentalism, supra note 
95, at 123–24 (discussing the diffusion of international environmental norms through “scientific 
receptor sites”). 
 209. Frank et al., The Nation-State, supra note 95, at 105–09. 
 210. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS AND OMBUDSMAN OFFICES: NATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Kamal Hossain et al. eds., 2000). 
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TABLE 2: CONDITIONAL MEMBERSHIP 211 
 Inclusive Restrictive 
Coercion 
1. Repeat interactions increase information 
2. Repeat interactions decrease cheating (by 
fostering future gains and developing 
reputations for compliance) 
3. The institutional setting decreases the 
transaction costs of gaining information and 
making agreements 
4. The process of reviewing membership 
involves transaction costs 
Note: A reason for inclusiveness exists if the 
size of membership increases the amount of 
rewards and penalties for members212 
1. Membership rules are 
information-forcing devices 
that reveal states’ 
willingness and capacity to 
join an organization213 
2. Smaller membership 
involves lower transaction 
costs in the management of 
an organization (but 
benefits accrue only to 
liberal states inside the 
organization)  
Persuasion 
1. Inclusion promotes opportunities for 
discussion, argument, and debate 
2. Inclusion lowers the transaction costs of 
collective communication and exchange 
3. The process of applying membership rules 
undermines a deliberative atmosphere 
Exclusion increases issue 
salience (e.g., with domestic 
audiences)  
Acculturation 
1. Inclusion produces strong social effects on 
insiders (i.e., embeddedness in regimes 
promotes conformity) 
2. Inclusion regulates forms of resistance 
3. Inclusion avoids creating a subculture of 
outsiders 
4. Inclusion promotes a message of 
universality in norm enunciation  
5. Larger membership maximizes social 
pressure (cumulative effect for back-patting 
and shaming) 
Risk: A high prevalence of violations among 
insiders risks institutionalizing undesirable 
behavior 
1. Membership itself is a 
device for conferring 
legitimacy and ostracizing 
outsiders affinity among 
insiders 
2. Membership rule 
strengthens affinity among 
members. 
3. The process of reviewing 
membership has 
institutionalizing benefits 
 
 
 211. These conclusions rely on two assumptions: (1) that the regime has sufficiently high 
human rights standards and (2) that one of the participants’ principal concerns is to change the 
behavior of governments engaged in frequent and severe human rights violations. 
 212. Also, issue linkage within a regime (linking human rights compliance with material 
rewards or penalties) would provide a stronger reason for a more inclusive rule. 
 213. If issue linkage includes rewards for mere membership, a stronger reason exists for a 
restrictive rule. 
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III. PRECISION OF OBLIGATIONS 
Another important choice in human rights regime design 
concerns the level of precision214 with which obligations are defined. 
Scholars consider “precision and elaboration . . . especially significant 
hallmarks of legalization at the international level.”215 The issue of 
precision has accordingly become a prominent topic in the study of 
international institutions.216 Like the debate over legal formalism in 
domestic law,217 these debates in international law persist without an 
adequate understanding of the connection between prescriptive 
claims and empirical assumptions. Commentators argue for—or 
against—precision without due regard for the manner in which their 
ostensibly normative claims are tethered to undefended or 
unexamined empirical propositions.  
Consider, for example, the debates about whether treaties or 
customary international law provides a better vehicle for regulating 
state practice. As Professor David Kennedy remarks in a more critical 
voice, “Are international norms best built by custom or treaty? 
International lawyers have worried about this for at least a century, 
one or the other mode coming in and out of fashion at various 
points.”218 Professor Kennedy suggests that these debates repeat 
themselves across generations of international legal scholars without 
moving matters forward. One reason for this repetition without 
progression may be the failure to specify and trace the significance of 
relevant behavioral logics. For example, according to some 
 
 214. We use a standard definition of precision: “Precision means that rules unambiguously 
define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe.” Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The 
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000); see also id. at 412 (“A precise rule 
specifies clearly and unambiguously what is expected of a state or other actor (in terms of both 
the intended objective and the means of achieving it) in a particular set of circumstances. In 
other words, precision narrows the scope for reasonable interpretation.”). 
 215. Id. at 414. 
 216. For example, in 2000, International Organization—the leading international relations 
journal—devoted a special issue to the topic of legalization. The authors of the volume identity 
“precision” as one of three characteristics for evaluating the concept of legalization across 
international institutions. Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 
54 INT’L ORG. 385, 387 (2000). Issues of “determinacy” figure prominently in Professor Thomas 
Franck’s influential study of international legal compliance. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra 
note 7, at 50–90. 
 217. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 
650–69 (1999) (discussing the empirical dimensions of disputes regarding domestic legal 
formalism).  
 218. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 335, 352 (2000). 
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commentators, treaties are better devices for regulating state 
behavior because they generally provide a level of specification that is 
difficult to obtain through custom.219 However, without empirical 
support, that assessment is largely conjecture. To test the assessment, 
it would be necessary to know whether, how, and under what 
conditions normative and legal precision actually influences state 
behavior. And it would be important to identify gaps in empirical 
information that must be filled to assess adequately the social effects 
of precision. It would also be important to discover whether states are 
likely under certain conditions to try to obfuscate their human rights 
obligations, to evaluate obligations deliberatively, or to mimic 
obligations. 
The language used to define obligations in human rights treaties 
is notoriously vague compared with the language used in other legal 
domains.220 A common view is that human rights treaties should aspire 
to greater levels of precision to foster compliance and enforcement.221 
Other commentators caution, however, that ambiguity can help build 
consensus in the treaty-drafting process.222 The issue of precision 
should thus be evaluated along two dimensions: ex ante effects on 
legislative processes and ex post effects on compliance. The following 
discussion analyzes the issue along those lines. 
 
 219. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 66 
(1991) (“It is easy to see the advantages of that process. . . . In place of the uncertain and slow 
process of custom, . . . [t]he text brings clarity and precision where there had been obscurity and 
doubt.”); id. at 71 (theorizing a “bureaucratic factor” that encourages the application of treaties 
because “[t]he law is declared in a concise and definitive form that is highly convenient for 
lawyers and officials”); Guzman, supra note 6, at 1876 (“Because CIL’s [customary international 
law’s] content is uncertain, states can often claim to have complied even when they have ignored 
the content of CIL. In other words, the commitment to CIL is more easily avoided than the 
commitment to a treaty.”); id. at 1877 (“Problems of clarity and a lack of explicit commitment 
on the part of states make CIL weaker than treaties.”).  
 220. Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvian Vité, International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law, 293 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 94, 106 (1993) (“[T]he major difficulty of applying 
human rights law as enunciated in the treaties is the very general nature of the treaty 
language.”).  
 221. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
371, 378 (1988) (remarks of Bruno Simma): 
What I have just said will be feasible, however, only if and to the degree that human 
rights treaty provisions are actually susceptible to violations in the sense that 
infringements of treaty provisions can be determined clearly. . . . Indeed, 
international human rights treaties are not notorious for the precision of their 
wording; they contain many vague and ambiguous provisions . . . . It will not be easy 
to localize clear-cut violations of such provisions . . . . 
 222. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 11; FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 7,  
at 52–53; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 434, 444–45. 
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A. Coercion 
According to the coercion approach, precision offers a number of 
advantages. A general assumption of the approach is that states act to 
maximize their own material well-being. Precision is therefore a 
valuable device for constraining “self-serving auto-interpretation”223—
thereby discouraging free riding and clearly defining what counts as 
cooperative behavior. The precise delineation of proscribed behavior 
can also help maximize the reputational effects of compliance and 
noncompliance. That is, reducing potential interpretive disputes over 
whether a state has fulfilled its obligations makes more certain the 
reputational costs of human rights violations (which may in turn 
translate into material costs).224 Moreover, if “reputational effects of a 
violation can be generalized to all agreements subject to international 
law”225—that is, if violations of a human rights treaty can damage a 
state’s overall reputation as a treaty partner—then human rights 
regimes can piggyback on issue areas in which states value their 
reputations more highly.226 Finally, because precision raises the costs 
of defection, it enhances the ability of regime participants to gauge 
the credibility of commitments; the act of ratifying a treaty with high 
 
 223. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 427. 
 224. See Abbott & Guzman, supra note 6, at 1863: 
The clarity of both the international obligation and its violation are important 
because a failure to live up to an international obligation triggers a reputational loss. 
The reputational consequences are most severe when the obligation is clear and the 
violation is unambiguous. As the uncertainty of an obligation increases, the 
reputational cost from a violation decreases. 
Recall that the coercion model incorporates reputation effects only insofar as they implicate 
directly some material cost or benefit. See supra Part I.C.3 (distinguishing acculturation and 
coercion in regard to social sanctions and rewards). 
 225. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 427; see id. (“When a commitment is cast as hard 
law, the reputational effects of a violation can be generalized to all agreements subject to 
international law, that is, to most international agreements.”); KEOHANE, supra note 28, at 106: 
For reasons of reputation, as well as fear of retaliation and concerns about the effects 
of precedents, egoistic governments may follow the rules and principles of 
international regimes even when myopic self-interest counsels them not to. . . . They 
might often decide, in light of this cost-benefit calculation, to conform to the rules. 
But see George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S95–S96 (2002) (disputing the influence of the reputational effects of 
noncompliance across regimes); Weisburd, supra note 31, at 104 (“[A] state’s breaches of 
human rights treaties may be seen as not indicating the likelihood of the state’s breaching other 
types of agreements and may not impact on the state’s reputation for reliability regarding such 
agreements.”).  
 226. See Guzman, supra note 6, at 1879–81 (discussing a state’s impact of reputational loss 
on capacity to extract concessions in negotiating future agreements). 
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levels of precision signals a willingness and capacity to make the 
grade.227 
Under the coercion approach, the most important cost of 
precision is its effect on treaty negotiations. Commentators suggest 
that ambiguity facilitates agreement in the drafting stage. Indeed, 
Professors Abbott and Snidal contend that ambiguity can be a “major 
advantage”228 in lowering contracting costs and that, in some 
circumstances, insisting on precision “may prevent agreement 
altogether.”229 The important point is that states will find it easier to 
build consensus at a higher level of abstraction. 
B. Persuasion 
The persuasion approach generally favors greater precision in 
the definition of legal obligations. Commentators relying on this 
mechanism often acknowledge, however, that imprecision may be 
necessary in the drafting and ratification processes.230 Nevertheless, 
these commentators argue that regime participants should endeavor 
to “concretize” treaty terms over time on the view that specificity 
facilitates persuasive interactions and norm internalization.231 These 
calls for evolutionary precision are typically tethered to 
recommendations concerning how best to design dispute resolution 
mechanisms—and, at times, are directed not to treaty makers but to 
actors and institutions created by the treaty (such as the independent 
experts serving on so-called treaty bodies).232 Because these proposals 
are so closely integrated with implementation strategies, we analyze 
them more fully in our discussion of enforcement in Part IV. 
 
 227. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 427 (stating that “[p]recision of individual 
commitments” is one way to enhance credibility and “increase[ ] the costs of reneging” on such 
commitments). 
 228. Id. at 434; id. at 436 (“In general, we hypothesize that softer forms of legalization will 
be more attractive to states as contracting costs increase.”).  
 229. Id. at 445.  
 230. See, e.g., id. (“Rather than hold up the overall agreement, states can incorporate 
hortatory or imprecise provisions to deal with the difficult issues, allowing them to proceed with 
the rest of the bargain.”). 
 231. Cf. id. (“Over time, if the soft arrangements are successful and without adverse 
consequences, the initially reluctant states may accept harder legalization.”).  
 232. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 314–18 (observing that supranational 
courts such as the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have 
incrementally expanded the application of the treaties under which they were created).  
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The important point for now is that persuasion-centered 
approaches emphasize the value of precision. For example, Professors 
Chayes and Chayes argue that extensive noncompliance stems from 
imprecision in how obligations are framed: “[A]mbiguity and 
indeterminacy of treaty language,” they contend, “lie at the root of 
much of the behavior that may seem to violate treaty 
requirements.”233 Under the persuasion approach, rules are most 
useful if they sharply reduce uncertainty about the content of 
obligations. In general, precise rules help clarify points of agreement 
and disagreement. This clarification facilitates targeted debates in 
which preexisting, even if thin, agreement on clearly defined 
obligations provides a normative framework within which the parties 
might move toward further agreement on more controversial matters. 
Recall that the touchstone of persuasion is that states internalize 
human rights norms following an active assessment of the 
justifications for these norms.234 On this view, it is the content of the 
rule that is assessed and, ideally, internalized. In this sense, the 
precision of legal obligations is central to the project of persuasion. In 
comparison, the acculturation approach tolerates greater disparity 
between acceptance of rules and actual practice. Under certain 
conditions states will accede to obligations to avoid social ostracism 
or to conform to orthodoxy—states might accept and (under some 
conditions) apply even imprecisely framed treaty obligations. 
More specifically, framing strategies analogize controversial 
practices to one or more clearly prohibited practices. This reasoning 
by analogy carries persuasive force only if the “frame” itself is well 
defined. Similarly, the strategy of cuing actors to think harder about 
controversial practices relies upon the precision of some underlying 
obligations. Recall that this tactic works because the persuadee is 
forced to confront and reconcile inconsistencies in stated positions.235 
This strategy is unlikely to prompt the persuadee to reevaluate 
controversial practices if inconsistencies are easily resolved because 
the underlying norms are highly malleable and easily subject to 
reinterpretation. 
 
 233. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 10; id. at 126–27 (explaining that “parties can 
more readily adapt their conduct” to the substantive norms of an international organization 
when those norms are made more precise); cf. Raustiala, supra note 7, at 78 
(“Managerialism . . . argues that the primary drivers of non-compliance are actually rule 
ambiguity and, especially, lack of domestic regulatory capacity.”). 
 234. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text.  
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It is useful at this point to elaborate on the intraregime contexts 
in which persuasive encounters might take place. First, the very 
exercise of drafting a legal instrument (such as a treaty, resolution, or 
declaration) provides an important opportunity for persuasive 
encounters. In the course of drafting text, debates over the specific 
definition of legal obligations are productive. Many commentators 
underscore the importance of these occasions as opportunities to 
enunciate norms: “They [substantive norms] are elaborated and given 
more concrete and specific form so that parties can more readily 
adapt their conduct.”236 In short, as with the membership procedures 
discussed in Part II, a seemingly arduous negotiation process—
understood in the coercion model in terms of transaction costs—is 
understood as a benefit in the persuasion model. The process affords 
valuable opportunities for discourse and exchange.237 
Second, persuasive encounters occur in the course of applying 
rules to specific practices once a regime is established. The existence 
of many structural opportunities for such encounters suggests that ex 
ante precision is less important than one might otherwise suppose. 
That is, states can draft imprecise rules and defer the process of 
specification to subsequent, intraregime encounters. This deferral 
typically involves delegation of interpretive authority to a dispute 
resolution or supervisory body established by the relevant treaty. 
Professors Abbott and Snidal explain that “[d]elegation is often the 
best way to deal with incomplete contracting problems,” because 
states can “utilize administrative . . . institutions to interpret and 
extend broad legal principles.”238 The mechanics of persuasion suggest 
some nontrivial virtues of deferral. Most importantly, deferral can 
provide structural opportunities for reflection, application, 
justification, and argument. “The discursive elaboration and 
application of treaty norms is the heart of the compliance process . . . . 
In the course of . . . debate, the performance required of a party in a 
particular case is progressively defined and specified.”239 That is, 
broad standards can furnish a general template against which 
“seemingly endless discussion of the scope and meaning of norms” 
 
 236. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 126. 
 237. See id. at 123 (“The participants seek, almost in Socratic fashion, to persuade each 
other of the validity of the successive steps in the dialectic.”). 
 238. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 433. 
 239. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 123.  
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can take place—an important, even if counterintuitive, benefit.240 
Perhaps most significantly, enmeshing rights-violating states in active 
interpretation and justification should facilitate the effectiveness of 
persuasion.241 
C. Acculturation 
The acculturation model departs significantly from canonical 
approaches to the “level of precision” problem. International 
instruments are often “remarkably precise and dense, presumably 
because proponents believe that these characteristics enhance their 
normative and political value.”242 The other two behavioral models 
are consistent with this line of thinking. Under the coercion and 
persuasion approaches, obtaining precision is generally considered 
essential to the long-term effectiveness of the regime. For these 
approaches, the major cost of precision is that it complicates ex ante 
negotiations by making it more difficult to obtain initial commitments 
from illiberal (or weakly liberal) states.243 In short, precision (1) 
increases the difficulty of reaching agreement ex ante but also (2) 
promotes compliance ex post. Under the acculturation approach, 
however, these effects are potentially reversed: precision that 
outstrips existing preferences might propel agreement, and 
imprecision will sometimes help to produce behavioral conformity. In 
other words, precision is potentially beneficial ex ante and costly ex 
post.  
 
 240. Id. at 126; see id. (“[T]he seemingly endless discussion of the scope and meaning of 
norms in the formal proceedings of the organization enhances their authoritative[ness] . . . . 
[T]he content of the substantive norms becomes more transparent.”). 
 241. See id. (“It becomes harder for a party to reject the normative command after treating 
it seriously and at length in debate within the organization.”); Risse, supra note 33, at 16 
(suggesting that governments first become entangled in arguments and then become persuaded 
by the logic of those arguments); cf. STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT 
ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 102–03, 113 (2001) (documenting that states employ shifting 
strategy of silence, denial, and partial acknowledgement when accused of violating accepted 
rules). 
 242. Abbott et al., supra note 214, at 414; see also FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 7, at 30–31 (“Rules which have a readily accessible meaning and which say 
what they expect of those who are addressed are more likely to have a real impact on 
conduct.”). 
 243. The effects of complicating negotiations might also yield important benefits such as 
fostering deliberation or conveying information. Nevertheless, the inability to reach agreement 
in negotiations, or to bring illiberal states on board, is part of the cost of obtaining those 
benefits. 
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We should say more about both the ex ante and the ex post 
effects. First, the acculturation approach suggests that precision will 
have less dramatic ex ante effects on treaty negotiations than either 
coercion or persuasion suggest. One might assume that establishing 
precise yet meaningful human rights obligations would require widely 
shared normative and political preferences across states. The 
existence of diverse cultures, national histories, and material 
resources may be thought to confound efforts to fashion global 
agreement in defining obligations. Indeed, some commentators even 
contend that cross-national diversity renders customary international 
law chimerical: “With over 180 nations representing an even larger 
number of cultures, international society lacks a reservoir of shared 
values or a common ideology from which to derive and perceive 
norms. Shared values and perceptions are essential to the formation 
of customary norms . . . .”244 As an empirical matter, however, 
remarkable levels of homogeneity exist across all states. 
Transnational convergence is apparent in wide-ranging areas such as 
education policy, science bureaucracies, development agendas, and 
environmental regulation.245 As we argue elsewhere, the patterns of 
policy convergence suggest the existence of a global culture (or 
“world polity”).246 This global cultural system indicates that some 
measure of precision is achievable, especially in areas related to 
globally shared norms. These convergent tendencies in policy and 
structure also indicate that treaty negotiators and nongovernmental 
organizations can efficiently demand greater levels of precision than 
persistent cross-national variations might suggest possible. Indeed, 
laggard states can be expected to accept particular policy or structural 
commitments earlier than their existing set of preferences might 
predict. Hence, demanding greater levels of precision in the 
legislative process could create opportunities for accelerating 
agreement. 
The second point—that imprecision promotes behavioral 
conformity ex post—requires an important qualification. Here, it is 
necessary to distinguish the two types of acculturation discussed 
 
 244. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 
465 (2000).  
 245. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1759–61 (suggesting global institutionalization 
of policies in a wide variety of areas); supra Part I.C.4. (proffering that studies demonstrate that 
states emulate standardized models of structural organization and public policy goals). 
 246. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 8, at 1757, 1767 (inferring the existence of global 
culture from “high levels of organizational isomorphism”). 
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earlier: conformity resulting from cognitive cues and conformity 
resulting from social sanctions.247 Both types of acculturation predict 
some measure of conformity (and other group-regarding behavior). 
As discussed previously, behavioral regularities do not issue from the 
content of the relevant rule or norm; rather, they are a function of the 
relations between individual actors and some reference group(s).248 
Conformity depends less on the properties of the rule than on the 
properties of the actor’s relationship to the community. Because the 
convention or norm is associated in general terms with the identity of 
the group, rules best foster conformity by “establish[ing] broad 
hortatory goals with few specific proscribed or prescribed 
activities.”249 This effect suggests that imprecision mobilizes “cognitive 
pressures” to adopt social norms (the first type of acculturation). 
Precision, on the other hand, is more likely to emphasize 
disagreements—triggering cognitive cues that the would-be reference 
group is importantly dissimilar from the target actor.250 There are, 
nevertheless, good reasons to suspect that precision might facilitate 
social rewards and sanctions—one of the two types of acculturation 
that we identify. One problem is that constructivist scholarship on the 
subject does not carefully distinguish the two types of acculturation. 
Therefore, the utility of precision has been obscured. 
Professor Thomas Franck’s discussion of “determinacy”251 helps 
explain both the distinction between the two types of acculturation 
and the potential benefits to precision. Franck discusses how precise 
rules promote compliance—emphasizing the social value of precision. 
His analysis of precision, however, generally suggests only one type of 
acculturation—the distribution of social sanctions. According to 
Franck, precision strengthens the perceived fairness (and legitimacy) 
of a rule because “it is thought fairer to impose rights and duties 
which can be understood and anticipated by those to whom they are 
addressed than to impose rights and duties which leave the reader 
 
 247. See supra Part I.C.1. (arguing that acculturation occurs through cognitive and social 
pressures). 
 248. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 249. Ronald B. Mitchell, International Control of Nuclear Proliferation: Beyond Carrots and 
Sticks, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall 1997, at 40, 46; see also David Strang & John W. Meyer, 
Institutional Conditions for Diffusion, 22 THEORY & SOC’Y 487, 493–94 (1993) (describing the 
importance of promulgating general conceptions of state obligations).  
 250. The literature here is substantial. See, e.g., Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9. 
 251. See FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 7, at 52 (arguing that precise rules are more 
likely to affect conduct). 
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unable to anticipate the vagaries of . . . interpretation.”252 Target states 
are accordingly more likely to accept the social sanction as legitimate, 
and other states are more likely to sponsor sanctions. In addition, 
Franck suggests that the determinacy of a rule will narrow the range 
of permissible interpretations and thus facilitate the regulatory effects 
of social sanctions. He contends that states, in trying to avoid the 
wrath of the community, will attempt to evade the application of a 
rule “by interpreting the rule permissively” and “using clever 
sophistry.”253 Precision limits that possibility. 
We agree that precision may strengthen social pressure by 
enhancing the legitimacy of a sanction. In that respect, an 
acculturation approach would value precision. Professor Franck’s 
analysis, however, is unsatisfactory because he undervalues (or fails 
to consider) the microprocesses of acculturation. Effective social 
sanctions (and rewards) require that target actors value the judgment 
of some reference group. Indeed, it is the approval of, or status in, 
this reference group that the target actor seeks. If precision outstrips 
the institutionalized preferences and expectations of target actors, 
then it disserves acculturation. As described above, too much 
precision risks deinstitutionalization.254 
Moreover, Professor Franck’s concern with self-serving and 
evasive interpretations does not easily fit the conceptual apparatus of 
acculturation through cognitive processes. Indeed, cognitive pressures 
suggest that states may be more inclined to conform their behavior to 
community expectations—and that they are unlikely to sustain, over 
the long term, an idiosyncratic interpretation of any norm that the 
international community considers central. The motivation to mimic 
the reference group is also self-directed. Indeed, states will even 
adopt legitimated practices under conditions of little or no 
surveillance by the international community.255 On this view, it is 
 
 252. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 33. 
 253. See id. at 31, 33 (arguing that the vagueness of a rule and noncompliance with it vary 
proportionately); see also FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 7, at 79–80 (positing that “sophist” 
rules are more likely to be ignored because their lack of precision renders them difficult to 
apply). 
 254. See, e.g., Zucker, Institutional Theories, supra note 9.  
 255. See, e.g., Aaron Benavot et al., Knowledge for the Masses: World Models and National 
Curricula, 1920–1986, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 85, 86, 90–91 (1991) (proposing that similarities among 
primary school curricula are linked to the rise of standardized models of society and noting that 
the same core subjects have appeared in most official curricula); Finnemore, supra note 188, at 
575–76, 581–82, 585–87 (arguing that states created science policy organizations in response to 
norms promoted by UNESCO (which redefined science as a state concern), but not because of 
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inaccurate to suggest that states embedded in international 
organizations will invariably engage in “unilateral, self-serving 
exculpatory interpretations of . . . rules.”256 Furthermore, Professor 
Franck’s analysis of this issue emphasizes the penalties side of social 
pressures, rather than social rewards or cognitive impulses to 
conform. In that respect, Professor Franck’s analysis indicates that 
precision may be a less valuable tool under conditions in which social 
sanctions are underutilized, infeasible, or expensive. 
 
coercion exerted by the organization); Frank et al., supra note 100, at 31–32 (emphasizing that 
global models of society—not local or national definitions of society—determine what is 
included in universities’ curricula).  
 256. FRANCK, LEGITIMACY, supra note 7, at 79; see id. (noting that the elasticity of 
“sophist” rules may undermine the legitimacy resulting from such rules).  
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TABLE 3: PRECISION OF OBLIGATIONS 
 Precision Ambiguity 
Coercion 
1. Ex post: Precision constitutes a 
clear yardstick, leaving less room 
to deny or contest violations 
2. Ex post: Precision augments 
reputational effects 
3. Ex post: Precision creates focal 
points 
1. Ex ante: Ambiguity 
facilitates agreement  
Persuasion 
1. Ex ante: The debate over exact 
rules is productive 
2. Ex ante: Precision leads to high 
levels of agreement because debate 
changes the minds of relevant 
actors 
3. Ex post: Imprecision engenders 
a lower degree of compliance 
because terms must be sufficiently 
precise to solve specific problems 
4. Ex post: Persuasion predicts high 
levels of compliance because 
agreement is genuine and reflects 
changed preferences 
1. Ex ante: Ambiguity 
facilitates agreement 
2. Ex post: Ambiguity 
generates the opportunity 
and need for subsequent 
discussions 
3. Ex post: The specific 
process of applying rules 
to practices propels the 
communicative process 
Acculturation 
1. Ex ante: Acculturation predicts a 
broader zone of potential 
agreement because of social 
pressures 
2. Ex ante: Acculturation predicts a 
broader zone of potential 
agreement because of a shared 
global culture  
1. Ex ante: Precision risks 
overemphasizing 
disagreement, which leads 
to deinstitutionalization 
2. Ex post: Acculturation 
predicts a high degree of 
compliance despite 
ambiguity because states 
are proven to follow 
general, even unstated, 
models 
3. Ex post: It is important 
to reach broad consensus 
for the institutionalizing 
effects 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION: MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT 
The final design issue that we examine is how best to monitor 
and enforce compliance with substantive regime rules. Admittedly, 
other design choices also bear on questions of compliance and 
effectiveness. But the devices for monitoring and enforcement 
probably have the most direct consequences for the observance of 
regime rules. Existing options range from “soft” to “hard” 
techniques. We discuss the following points along that spectrum:  
1. Publishing Best Practices 
Examples include the International Coordinating Committee for 
National Human Rights Institutions,257 U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights;258 
2. Monitoring and Reporting 
Examples include the Special Mechanisms under the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights,259 Inter-American Commission of 
 
 257. The International Coordinating Committee is an umbrella organization  
representing national-level human rights institutions (e.g., commissions and  
ombudsmen). Along with the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee  
has developed best practices for national human rights institutions. Documents relating  
to best practices for the implementation of human rights regimes and programs are available  
at http://www.nhri.net; see also Commonwealth Secretariat, National Human Rights 
Institutions: Best Practice (2001) www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/ 
%7BBF05153F-7565-4A2F-8F2A-F002F05594EC%7D_HumanRightsBestPractice.pdf. 
 258. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights is the  
main subsidiary body of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The Sub-Commission is 
comprised of twenty-six independent experts who meet annually to undertake studies and make 
recommendations on thematic agenda items. The Sub-Commission has assisted in the 
development of best practices in areas such as affirmative action. E.g., The Concept of 
Affirmative Action, U.N. ESCOR Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 
3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/11 (2000). 
 259. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights appoints independent individuals  
(special rapporteurs) or a group of individuals (a working group) to address specific  
country situations (e.g., Burma/Myanmar) or thematic issues (e.g., torture). These  
individuals and groups examine, monitor, advise, and publicly report on human rights  
situations in specific states and on types of human rights violations across different states.  
Links to studies and reports of special rapporteurs and working groups on these topics  
can be found at the Commission’s website at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/ 
liststudrepts.htm.  
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Human Rights,260 periodic state reports to international human 
rights treaty bodies;261 
3. Criticizing Bad Actors 
Examples include the country resolutions by the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights,262 concluding observations by international 
human rights treaty bodies on state periodic reports;263 
4. Binding Decisions and Material Sanctions 
Examples include the European Court of Human Rights,264 
International Criminal Court.265 
Scholars also offer variations on existing structures. Professor 
Laurence Helfer and Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, 
propose institutional changes to make treaty bodies appear and act 
 
 260. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is a permanent organ of the 
Organization of American States. The mandate of the Commission includes conducting on-site 
visits to investigate specific situations and publishing special reports regarding human rights 
conditions in particular states. For individual country reports, see the Commission’s website at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/publi.eng.htm. 
 261. The six principal human rights treaties each require state parties to submit a period 
report to a supervisory organ, called a “treaty body,” which reviews the state’s compliance with 
the treaty obligations. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 
138, art. 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181–82 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized 
herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights . . . .”); see also supra note 138 
(listing the six treaties).  
 262. See supra note 139 (describing the Commission on Human Rights). The Commission on 
Human Rights is empowered to adopt resolutions criticizing a U.N. member state in “situations 
which reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights.” E.S.C. Res. 1235, U.N. 
ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, 1479th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc E/4393 (1967).  
 263. The concluding observations of a treaty body provide a collective assessment of a 
state’s periodic report. Concluding observations commonly include a declaration of factors 
impeding the application of the treaty and criticism of specific practices. For example, 
concluding observations from reports by the Committee against Torture are available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ menu2/6/cat/cats.htm. For additional background information on 
and links to treaty monitoring bodies, reports, and reporting requirements, see Amnesty 
International’s website at http://web.amnesty.org/ pages/treaty-periodic-reports-eng. 
 264. Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are binding. Responsibility for 
supervising the execution of judgments lies with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, supra 
note 172, art. 46 (requiring states parties to abide by judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights and empowering the Committee of Ministers to enforce such judgments).  
 265. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 77, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3, 135 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
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more like courts.266 Dean Harold Koh emphasizes the importance of 
increasing transnational adjudication.267 Professors Jack Goldsmith 
and Stephen Krasner both stress that economic and military force 
would best promote human rights,268 and they question whether new 
institutions (the International Criminal Court) and new doctrines 
(humanitarian intervention) support or undermine the maximum use 
of that power.269 Notably, these projects share the sense that the 
monitoring and enforcement options listed above reflect a continuum 
of effectiveness. Such proposals reflect the view that compliance is 
best induced by the exercise of coercive authority—such as military 
intervention or binding decisions of third-party monitoring 
institutions. This view, we maintain, is called into question by the 
acculturation approach. Indeed, we posit that, under certain 
conditions, “soft law” mechanisms will be more effective in 
establishing durable norms. 
In examining this set of design issues, it is important to isolate 
the effects suggested by each of the three mechanisms of social 
influence. One might mistakenly suppose that exploiting a range of 
tactics—without having to delve into finer details of mechanisms and 
behavioral logics—is a pragmatically sound approach. This response, 
however, is riddled with problems. First, and perhaps most obviously, 
effective regime design often requires setting priorities and making 
tough choices with limited resources. Accordingly, enforcement 
decisions should be based on a comparison of the expected utility of 
each option, as measured by the probability of achieving behavioral 
 
 266. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 366 (suggesting that the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee take additional steps to reinforce those characteristics that tend to make it more like 
a tribunal). 
 267. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 
(1991); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203 
(1996) (suggesting that interaction between states and the transnational legal process 
encourages compliance with international law).  
 268. Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 970–72 (summarizing Professor Krasner’s argument that 
“power” and self-interest account for states’ adherence to international norms); Krasner, supra 
note 31, at 139–40, 166–67 (suggesting and then concluding that “realism”—via the use of 
military power—is necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, to ensure enforcement of human 
rights regimes). 
 269. See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 89, 89 (2003) (asserting that the “ICC depends on U.S. . . . military . . . and economic 
support for its success”); Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 
DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47, 56–57 (arguing that the ICC cannot fulfill its goals without U.S. 
military support and that the ICC may in fact increase impunity for human rights violations by 
decreasing the likelihood of such military support to punish noncompliance). 
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change.270 Second, the features of the three mechanisms reveal 
potential incompatibilities among strategies. For example, as we 
discuss below, some forms of coercion would undercut strategies for 
fostering acculturation; that is, coercive tactics can have a 
deinstitutionalizing effect. Some of these conflicts can be managed, 
whereas others are more fundamental. Third, the central practical 
concerns of specific strategic options vary by social logic. For 
example, the persuasion approach is most concerned about 
“overlegalization” by third-party monitoring institutions.271 Other 
concerns that vary by behavioral logic include the informational 
politics employed by various strategies—such as the type and timing 
of disclosures.272 In short, sensible regime design must carefully 
consider the three social mechanisms when fashioning 
implementation strategies.273 
A. Coercion 
Under the coercion approach, traditional notions of power—
military and economic—provide the principal machinery for changing 
state practices. Treaty regimes discourage undesirable behavior by 
increasing its costs (or, alternatively, encourage desirable behavior by 
 
 270. Studying mechanisms of social influence may also help assess the likelihood that states 
will resort to one strategy or another. For example, Professors Chayes and Chayes reject several 
coercive strategies not because the respective approach would be ineffective if deployed but 
because they conclude that the prospects of states using such an approach are dim. See CHAYES 
& CHAYES, supra note 7, at 63–66 (criticizing international economic sanctions for being 
ineffective because consensus is difficult to assemble and maintain, sanctions are slow to 
operate, and enforcement decisions are essentially made on a national level). 
 271. Cf. Helfer, supra note 4, at 1855–58 (suggesting that overlegalization by way of highly 
effective enforcement mechanisms may lead to a backlash against human rights treaties, 
including withdrawal).  
 272. See Mitchell, supra note 249, at 48–49 (summarizing the transparency requirements of 
various nonproliferation strategies).  
 273. Understanding the impact of the different logics can also help identify important, 
incidental social effects of a design choice. For example, coercive devices—such as binding 
decisions by supranational institutions—may most effectively produce social change through 
their noncoercive effects (such as helping to frame issues). Evaluating their utility should thus 
take into account predicted outcomes—not simply express objectives such as deterrence and 
raising costs of proscribed behavior. This lens reveals how NGO strategies that may appear 
naive—such as constructing tribunals to deter tyrants or advocating that regime principles apply 
equally to powerful liberal states—could reflect more sophisticated understandings of symbolic 
politics than critics recognize. See Goldsmith, supra note 269, at 90, 95 (criticizing NGO’s stated 
goal in creating the ICC and arguing that the ICC will reduce human rights protections); 
Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 269, at 53 (criticizing the political platforms of human rights 
NGOs with respect to constructing international criminal tribunals).  
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rewarding its practice). On this view, the best prospects for 
orchestrating change include establishing “agreements with teeth” 
(e.g., the International Criminal Court via criminal sanctions274 or the 
U.N. Charter via Security Council enforcement measures275) and 
arrangements that link human rights performance to financial and 
military interests (e.g., conditional U.S. security assistance276 or good 
governance requirements for World Bank loans277). 
The coercion approach does not value highly soft strategies such 
as publishing best practices or monitoring and reporting human rights 
abuses—except insofar as these strategies are integrated into some 
coercive apparatus. Publishing best practices, for example, might 
serve to establish standards of conduct around which coercive 
measures can be organized—in other words, these focal points might 
help regime participants identify good and bad actors. However, 
utilizing best practices in this manner probably contradicts the 
informal character of their promulgation278 and ignores the fact that 
they represent a prospective ideal.279 Indeed, tying best practices to 
coercive strategies would frustrate the relaxed political process 
through which organizations generally draft, endorse, and promote 
such standards. Monitoring and reporting are also considered 
 
 274. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 265, arts. 103–111, 
2187 U.N.T.S. at 150–53 (detailing enforcement mechanisms for criminal sentences, specifically 
the relationship between the ICC and the states parties to enforce such sentences).  
 275. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39–51 (detailing enforcement actions that the Security Council can 
take to maintain peace and security or to respond to acts of aggression). 
 276. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (2000) (prohibiting 
security assistance for any country whose government consistently violates internationally 
recognized human rights). 
 277. See World Bank Group, Governance & Anti-Corruption: About Governance, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/about.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (providing general information about the World Bank’s strategy and 
approach to promoting good governance in client countries). 
 278. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has sometimes assumed 
responsibility for compiling and publishing best practices in the human rights field. The Office 
of the U.N. Secretary-General has undertaken similar initiatives, as has the Sub-Commission on 
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. Each of these bodies is comprised of U.N. 
administrative officials or independent experts, not states. These institutions accordingly lend 
themselves to informal, less politicized processes. See, e.g., supra notes 257–58 (providing links 
to best practices information). 
 279. Cf. Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: The 
Sullivan and MacBride Principles, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-
BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 418, 422 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) 
(suggesting that political principles can only operate effectively if the legal system provides 
them with “breathing room” in which to operate, and implying that excessive determinacy and 
enforcement would likely backfire). 
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valuable—if connected to coercive tools. They might generate 
information according to which rewards and penalties could be 
directed. Linking information about state practices to coercive tactics, 
however, can also force information underground.280 Indeed, coercive 
strategies might provide states with incentives to conceal the very 
types of information most useful to the persuasion or acculturation 
approach. 
The coercion approach also considers official criticism to be 
largely unimportant. As a direct coercive technique, criticism 
constitutes a nominal sanction. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive of 
the net benefit of criticism alone once transaction costs are taken into 
account. Nevertheless, depending on the nature of the institutions 
responsible for levying criticism, the practice may help to delineate 
proscribed behavior. For example, Professors Abbott and Snidal 
explain that states may promulgate relatively general directives in 
response to ex ante contracting costs and thus may designate 
institutions to elaborate more specific rules.281 The creation of a 
formal body to criticize state performance—and thereby apply legal 
obligations to practice—can serve this process of elaboration. 
Additionally, graduated criticism might convey useful information to 
a targeted state to facilitate reorientation of its practices. Specifically, 
graduated criticism might signal the existence of a political 
commitment to employ coercive power.282 Of course, this suggests that 
official criticism should be used judiciously to maintain the credibility 
of threats over time. This understanding of official criticism is 
inconsistent with tactics of persuasion and acculturation, which rely 
on more liberal or sweeping use of criticism (for example, to bring 
attention to events or to facilitate the process of institutionalizing 
norms). 
 
 280. Mitchell, supra note 249, at 41–42. 
 281. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 153, at 433–34 (“Delegation is often the best way to 
deal with incomplete contracting problems.”). 
 282. As an illustration, the U.N. Security Council has adopted a routine of using deliberately 
graduated language in a series of resolutions, before activating its more powerful enforcement 
authority.  
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B. Persuasion 
Under the persuasion approach, “managerialism”283 is the central 
medium for promoting regime objectives. Managerialism suggests 
that human rights regimes can encourage desirable behavior in two 
ways: (1) by systematically engaging governments in discussion about 
controversial practices and (2) by fostering structural opportunities 
for transnational networks to engage governments (or other relevant 
audiences).284 On this view, states can be convinced to embrace regime 
norms (1) through organizational arrangements that facilitate 
meaningful communicative exchanges among stakeholders (e.g., the 
International Labor Organization285) and (2) through the exercise of 
“good offices” by high-level officials (e.g., the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe286). 
Furthermore, according to the persuasion approach, monitoring 
and reporting can induce change if conducted in a sensitive manner. 
Some persuasion scholars recommend these strategies as means of 
generating useful information and cooperative solutions. Professors 
Chayes and Chayes, for example, discuss the usefulness of directing 
states’ attention to potential defections to facilitate management of 
 
 283. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, at 542 (“The theory was ‘managerial’ in that it 
rejected sanctions and other ‘hard’ forms of enforcement in favor of collective management of 
(non)performance.”); id. at 542–43 (describing principles of managerialism). 
 284. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 126–27 (stating that “endless discussion 
of . . . norms . . . enhances their authoritative character”); Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 2, 
at 543 (discussing prescriptive strategies for managing noncompliance in accordance with this 
theoretical approach).  
 285. The International Labor Organisation (ILO) is structured on a tripartite system; each 
country is represented by delegations from government, labor, and business. The members meet 
regularly to devise policy recommendations, develop standards, and discuss implementation. 
ILO, Structure of the ILO, at http://www.ilo.org/public/English/depts./fact.htm (last updated 
Sept. 26, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 286. Ratner, supra note 74, at 595 (arguing that the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities exemplifies “an innovative instrument for persuading relevant domestic decision-
makers to comply through a set of distinct . . . strategies,” and stating that “[t]hese . . .aspects of 
the European experience represent a direct challenge to existing theories on compliance with 
international law”); id. at 695 (“The work of the High Commissioner shows the salience of 
softer forms of law not merely as pieces of paper, but as tools of persuasion.”); see also Harold 
Hongju Koh, A Job Description for The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 35 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 493, 500–01 (2004) (arguing “that the Commissioner is best able to 
draw attention to economic, social, and cultural rights” when these rights are denied to 
minorities). 
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such defections.287 The significance of periodic state reports can help 
states and other interested actors to assess actual practices under the 
terms of the treaty. The open exchange of ideas and experiences 
assists “the winnowing out of reasonably justifiable or unintended 
failures to fulfill commitments . . . and the identification and isolation 
of the few cases of egregious and willful violation.”288 Monitoring and 
reporting can also serve an important function in cuing states to think 
harder about human rights violations—another valuable ingredient in 
the persuasion process.289 Accordingly, international organizations 
could create institutional environments in which new information 
(e.g., about the type or prevalence of human rights violations) would 
be routinely and systematically linked to broadly established values. 
In contrast, a second variant of the persuasion scholarship suggests 
that regimes do not have to emphasize exposing state practices. 
External surveillance is considered less important because the 
dominant social influence is based on sincere acceptance of the 
content of the rules.290 Nevertheless, disclosures that reveal new types 
and patterns of violations are independently important in that they 
change minds about the significance and prevalence of human rights 
violations.291 These views, in turn, help mobilize (and organize) 
responses at a systemic level. And finally, as we discussed above, 
some of this scholarship recommends strategies not clearly linked to 
the persuasion-centered causal account—indeed, they seem to rely on 
coercion or acculturation processes. For example, some 
commentators suggest that social sanctions will gradually compel 
states to narrow the gap between position-taking and actual 
practice.292 
 
 287. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 126–27 (asserting that the process of 
evaluating alleged noncompliance clarifies norms and defines the performance required to bring 
a state party into compliance). 
 288. Id. at 28. 
 289. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text (discussing cuing as a persuasion 
technique). 
 290. In discussing this regulatory strategy in the nuclear proliferation context, Professor 
Ronald Mitchell explains: “Monitoring potential proliferant behavior becomes unnecessary 
since actors serve as ‘their own ubiquitous inspectors.’” Mitchell, supra note 249, at 45 (quoting 
EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 248 (1982)).  
 291. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 16 (describing transnational networks’ 
strategy of using information to shame state actors and to raise awareness of human rights 
violations).  
 292. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 7, at 123 (“The participants seek . . . to persuade 
each other . . . . Since the party has participated in each stage of the argument, the pressures to 
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Less clear in the persuasion model is the effectiveness of criticism 
and sanctions. The literature is ambivalent on this issue. One school 
of thought maintains that criticism and more severe penalties can 
complement efforts at persuasion. Indeed, the (implicit or explicit) 
threat of sanctions may bring states to the table in the first place.293 
Moreover, some scholarship stresses the importance of persuasion 
but finds its greatest impact in encouraging transnational political 
movements and foreign states to leverage concessions from 
recalcitrant states.294 In sharp contrast, other scholarship argues that 
criticism and more severe penalties have a deleterious effect on the 
communicative atmosphere required for collective deliberation to 
thrive.295 Criticism may, therefore, also discourage states from 
systematically reviewing new types and patterns of human rights 
violations.296 
C. Acculturation 
Under the acculturation approach, power is understood as 
productive, cultural, and diffuse—not merely prohibitory, material, 
and centralized. Treaty regimes can induce desirable behavior 
through processes that institutionalize models of legitimate state 
practice and that link states and their citizenry to forums that 
 
conform to the final judgment are great.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 119 (“Failure to 
behave in ways for which one can construct acceptable accounts leads to varying degrees of 
censure . . . . It is . . . crucial that international relations are conducted in large part through 
diplomatic conversation—explanation and justification, persuasion and dissuasion, approval and 
condemnation.”).  
 293. See id. at 26, 28 (suggesting that “justificatory discourse” and “[t]he need to be a 
member in good standing” of the international community exert strong pressure on states to 
comply with human rights obligations). 
 294. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 12, 16, 117; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 18–22 (citing scholarship suggesting that activist networks use human rights norms to 
convince audiences to encourage their governments to persuade nonconforming states to 
comply with such norms). In terms of framing effects in particular (and thus within the strict 
terms of the persuasion model), criticism of a state’s behavior can also increase the salience of 
an issue. 
 295. Notably, scholars who derive their models of communicative action from Jürgen 
Habermas stress the purity of discourse free of coercive techniques. See, e.g., Payne, supra note 
7, at 41–42 (agreeing with the argument that exacting concessions through material exchanges 
(bribes) is not free of distortion and that such bribes prevent the development of shared 
normative values). 
 296. Cf. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater 
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 44 (1997) (arguing that 
international environmental agreements can hasten progressive implementation of norms by 
avoiding the use of words such as “dispute” or “compliance”). 
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elaborate and apply such standards. Furthermore, the theory of 
acculturation suggests that regimes should carry out a number of 
activities: allocate available resources to assist states in reporting on 
their own human rights practices (e.g., under Article 40 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights297), facilitate 
transnational experts in human rights consultancy (e.g., the technical 
and advisory services of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights298), and create local “receptor sites” for transmitting 
global norms (e.g., by establishing and strengthening national human 
rights commissions).299 
Acculturation values the publication of best practices more 
highly than does either of the other mechanisms. Admittedly, the 
general approach would not suggest relying heavily on this method. 
Nevertheless, publishing best practices can contribute to the process 
of standardization. States may be more willing to adopt such models, 
at faster rates and more durably, than the other approaches suggest. 
The emulation of best practices will not require persuading relevant 
actors. State policies that “mimic” best practices should also be more 
durable than policy shifts caused by coercion—the policies should 
generally persist even when material pressure is no longer applied or 
available. 
Monitoring and reporting can also perform valuable functions in 
a regime that takes acculturation seriously. However, these devices 
should be used differently depending on the form of acculturation 
being harnessed.300 With respect to conformity through social rewards 
and sanctions, it is vital to expose wrongdoing (and to tie exposure to 
external praise and criticism). Accordingly, external surveillance and 
reporting—especially by third-party states and organizations—should 
be significant parts of the monitoring and reporting apparatus.301 
 
 297. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 138, art. 40. 
 298. See U.N. OFFICE OF HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS., FACT SHEET NO. 3, 
ADVISORY SERVICES AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
(1996) (describing the history, current status, and scope of providing advisory services to states 
parties and NGOs to help member countries implement human rights treaties and other related 
obligations), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs3.htm.  
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 208–10 and accompanying text (citing acculturation 
scholarship suggesting that national human rights commissions serve to accelerate diffusion of 
norms). 
 300. See supra Part I.C.1 (describing the two microprocesses of acculturation: social pressure 
and cognitive pressure). 
 301. Cf. ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 85–86 (2002) (describing the effectiveness of U.S. State Department reports on human 
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With respect to acculturation through cognitive pressure, 
monitoring and reporting serve different functions. States will 
formally adopt particular conventions even under conditions of 
nonsurveillance. That is, they will accede to particular norms in the 
process of identity formation and mimicry of globally promulgated 
models. External monitoring and reporting are thus not necessarily 
required (a fact that human rights regimes should take into account 
when considering how to expend limited resources). Nevertheless, 
visibility might perform a regulatory function. Indeed, the leading 
social theorist on discursive practices, Michel Foucault, emphasizes 
the power of visibility in regulating social behavior.302 A regime 
attempting to exploit these attributes might stress reporting by a 
state’s own organs, not simply reporting by third parties. Indeed, the 
very process of identifying, describing, and controlling human rights 
practices helps the diffusion of the human rights discourse through 
global and local levels. This general approach, however, would 
require care not to institutionalize noncompliance. As suggested by 
recent studies of domestic order maintenance,303 international regimes 
should be concerned that emphasizing the prevalence of violations 
might promote disorder and further violations.304 
 
rights practices of other countries); KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 18, at 23 (“Moral leverage 
involves what some commentators have called the ‘mobilization of shame,’ where the behavior 
of target actors is held up to the light of international scrutiny . . . . on the assumption that 
governments value the good opinion of others . . . .”).  
 302. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1978); MICHEL FOUCAULT, Questions on 
Geography, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972–
1977, at 63, 72 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) (emphasizing that 
surveillance is one way that states and individuals can monitor each other); James F. Keeley, 
Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes, 44 INT’L ORG. 83, 92 (1990) (briefly 
explaining how “actors are defined and become visible as targets of observation and control”); 
cf. Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social 
Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 687–89 (2001) (explaining Foucault’s analysis of visibility—i.e., 
exposure via surveillance—in constructing norms and inducing behavioral regularity). 
 303. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: 
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 19 (1996) (citing the 
“Broken Windows” study, which indicates a correlation between publicly visible disorder and 
more serious crimes); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 349, 366, 369–70 (1997) (supporting the “Broken Windows” theory that public disorder 
lowers the “price” of serious crime). 
 304. More theoretical work could examine how these concerns might relate to Foucault’s 
notion of “incitement to discourse”—a social process in which classification and prohibition 
help produce perversions. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 17–
35 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978). 
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Under certain conditions, binding third-party decisions and 
material sanctions may weaken the effectiveness of acculturation. 
Cognitive dissonance studies suggest that the simultaneous presence 
of instrumental threats and promises can undermine subtle forms of 
socialization.305 Actors are more willing to embrace a practice or idea 
if they consider the decision to comply an act of personal choice 
(intrinsic motivation), rather than one compelled by external force 
(extrinsic motivation). However, the applicability of this theory to 
states (either at the macrolevel of states or the microlevel of 
diplomats, elites, or domestic publics) is questionable. Additionally, 
once norms are internalized, more intrusive (and perhaps coercive) 
measures might then be legitimated (e.g., the European Court of 
Human Rights306).  
 
 305. See, e.g., Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, Rethinking the Value of Choice: A 
Cultural Perspective on Intrinsic Motivation, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 349, 364 (1999) 
(reporting results of studies indicating that theories and paradigms of motivation reflect the 
cultures in which they are developed); cf. Mark R. Lepper, Social-Control Processes and the 
Internalization of Social Values: An Attributional Perspective, in SOCIAL COGNITION AND 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 294, 318 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1983) (suggesting that systems of 
rewards and punishments will be used in different contexts). 
 306. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 4, at 314–17 (discussing the importance of 
incrementalism in the evolution of European Community law and European human rights law). 
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TABLE 4: MECHANISMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Publishing 
Best 
Practices 
Monitoring and 
Reporting 
Criticizing Bad 
Actors 
Binding Decisions and 
Sanctions 
Coercion Negligible 
Effective (in 
providing 
information) if tied 
to coercion 
Negligible 
Highly effective and 
essential 
Persuasion Moderately effective 
One View: Highly 
effective: Monitor-
ing and reporting 
devices generate 
issue salience (e.g., 
they change minds 
regarding the 
gravity of a 
problem)  
Another View: 
Moderately 
important if the 
states already 
agree on a rule 
Potentially 
effective: Criticism 
generates issue 
salience  
Potentially 
counterproductive: 
Criticism has a 
deleterious impact 
on the communic-
ative atmosphere 
Potentially counter-
productive: Sanctions 
create incentives not to 
reveal information 
Risk: “Overlegalization” 
(third-party adjudicator 
exceeds states’ accep-
tance of obligation) 
Accultur- 
ation Effective 
Highly effective 
and important 
Risk: Emphasizing 
prevalence risks 
institutionalizing 
noncompliance  
Highly effective 
and important: 
Criticism mobilizes 
shame 
 
Potentially counter-
productive: Sanctions 
create incentives not to 
reveal information 
Potentially productive if 
there are high levels of 
institutionalization 
Risk: Sanctions can 
undermine institut-
ionalization (i.e., when 
cognitive dissonance 
exists, coercive force can 
actually undermine 
acceptance) 
Risk: Coercion 
administered inequitably 
(e.g., by imposing double 
standards or by shielding 
some states from 
sanctions) undercuts 
social influence 
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V. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL 
In this Article, our principal objectives are to analyze the 
characteristics of each mechanism of social influence and to 
demonstrate their significance for institutional design, in the hope of 
assisting future research agendas in international legal scholarship—
empirical, conceptual, and doctrinal. Having now analyzed the 
microprocesses that comprise each mechanism, we offer some 
provisional comments about the prospects for developing an 
empirically grounded approach that would integrate all three 
mechanisms in fashioning a human rights regime. Such an approach—
which would appreciate the distinct qualities of, and interactions 
among, the processes of coercion, persuasion, and acculturation—is in 
our view essential to building an effective human rights regime. In 
this Part, we identify some general features that such a model should 
include. 
First, an integrated model should take seriously the processes of 
acculturation. Indeed, acculturation has been systematically 
undervalued (and, at times, misunderstood) in debates about human 
rights regimes. As discussed above,307 commentators rarely invoke 
acculturation; when they do, it is often either (1) conflated with 
persuasion or (2) unexplained. Yet, the acculturation approach is 
potentially quite useful in the context of human rights law. As we 
mention in the Introduction, there are several reasons to suspect that 
the other mechanisms will prove ineffective in this arena. States 
generally lack sufficient interest or political will to sustain an effective 
strategy of coercion. Persuasion approaches require internalization of 
the values of human rights regimes—and there is little evidence to 
suggest that this is a reliable method of socializing bad actors. Indeed, 
theories of persuasion do not provide a useful way to think about 
partial or incomplete internalization. In short, the prevailing 
approaches will prove ineffective. Furthermore, as the analysis of 
membership rules demonstrates, acculturation strategies greatly value 
the social effects generated by intergovernmental organizations. In 
contrast, both coercion and persuasion operate quite effectively 
outside formal organizational settings. 
Second, an integrated model should account for negative 
interactions among the three mechanisms. Simply put, deploying one 
 
 307. See supra Part I (reviewing mechanisms of social influence, including acculturation). 
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mechanism might undermine the ability to deploy another. For 
example, overt coercion can interfere with persuasion strategies by 
polarizing group deliberations. Coercion may also undercut 
acculturation by suggesting that the target behavior is not self-
evidently appropriate—the “deinstitutionalization” effect that we 
describe above.308 Persuasion and acculturation may similarly 
countermand one another if the former focuses attention on resolving 
particular substantive disagreements among states when the latter 
stresses abstract commonalities. Persuasion and acculturation 
strategies may also conflict when the former highlights the prevalence 
of human rights violations as a framing device and the latter, to avoid 
the institutionalization of undesirable behavior, casts such violations 
as aberrant. 
Third, an integrated model should endeavor to identify the 
conditions under which the various mechanisms operate successfully. 
For example, the effectiveness of all three mechanisms will likely vary 
according to the socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions of the 
relevant states. In particular, it is important to assess the structural 
capacities of states to monitor human rights practices and sanction 
human rights violations. The likelihood, feasibility, and costs of these 
measures will often determine which strategy (or strategies) should 
predominate. Another important variable is the character of the 
extant structural relations at the global or regional level. For example, 
the effectiveness of various mechanisms should turn on 
considerations such as the density of international interactions, the 
axes along which relevant states share important cultural 
characteristics (including religion, ethnicity, and language), and the 
distribution of military and economic power. 
Finally, an integrated model should consider various 
“sequencing” effects. That is, an integrated model might emphasize 
different mechanisms at different stages of the institutionalization of a 
norm. For example, there may be reason to coerce states into formal 
organizations in which they are later subject to measures that rely on 
persuasion or acculturation. If acculturation can alter state 
preferences over time, intergovernmental organizations might 
incorporate more flexible administrative devices such as 
 
 308. See supra text accompanying note 305 (arguing that cognitive dissonance studies 
suggest that institutional regimes combining threats and rewards can undermine subtle 
socialization techniques); see also Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 
J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 596–606 (2001) (summarizing this growing literature).  
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renegotiation clauses—essentially devices that recognize that the 
preferences of states may be systematically influenced by their very 
participation in an organization. These insights suggest that a human 
rights regime might also enhance its effectiveness by demanding 
modest initial commitments and ratcheting up obligations over time. 
More specifically, strategies could include allowing supervisory 
organs to expand their authority incrementally and creating 
opportunities for optional protocols only after an organization has 
existed for a particular time period. Under certain conditions, a 
regime might concentrate on exploiting the effects of acculturation 
before investing heavily in persuasive techniques to define obligations 
more precisely. Also, human rights regimes can potentially employ 
coercive techniques most effectively once robust levels of 
internalization have occurred. This strategy of delayed onset coercion 
reflects, in many respects, the evolutionary path of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
These reflections on the general contours of an integrated model 
are, we recognize, provisional. The full elaboration of an integrated 
model will require further empirical and conceptual work. 
Nevertheless, we contend that a few basic points should guide this 
work. First, the project of building an effective international human 
rights regime will be stymied if the microprocesses of social influence 
are not taken into account. And, second, considerable attention must 
be given to the force of acculturation. 
CONCLUSION 
Regime design choices turn on empirical claims about how states 
behave and under what conditions their behavior changes. We 
suggest that a central problem for human rights regimes is how best to 
socialize “bad actors” to incorporate globally legitimated models of 
state behavior and how to get “good actors” to perform better. 
Substantial empirical evidence suggests three distinct mechanisms 
whereby states and institutions might influence the behavior of other 
states: coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. Several structural 
impediments preclude full institutionalization of coercion- and 
persuasion-based regimes in human rights law. Yet, inexplicably, 
these models of behavioral modification predominate in international 
legal studies. In this Article, we first unpack the components of each 
mechanism. We then link each of the identified mechanisms of social 
influence to specific regime design characteristics—identifying several 
GOODMAN & JINKS FINAL.DOC 8/12/2005 10:48 AM 
2004] SOCIALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 703 
ways in which acculturation might occasion a rethinking of 
fundamental regime design problems in human rights law. Through a 
systematic evaluation of three design problems—conditional 
membership, precision of obligations, and enforcement methods—we 
identify and elaborate acculturation as a third way to conceive of 
regime design problems. We maintain that (1) acculturation is a 
conceptually distinct social process through which state behavior is 
influenced and (2) the regime design recommendations issuing from 
this approach defy conventional wisdom in international human rights 
scholarship. This exercise not only recommends reexamination of 
policy debates in human rights law, but also provides a conceptual 
framework within which the costs and benefits of various design 
principles and political strategies might be assessed. Our aim is to 
improve the understanding of how norms operate in international 
society with a view to improving the capacity of global and domestic 
institutions to harness the processes through which human rights 
cultures are built. Regime design in human rights law must then seek 
to incorporate what is known about global culture, the diffusion of 
practices within and across societies, and the processes of social 
influence more generally. This Article is, we hope, a step in that 
direction. 
